As surprising as it may seem, in its principles, the unfolding of an attack against a foreign country by relying on the French and Russian methods in psychological warfare is the same as that of a mission of social elimination executed against a single individual. Still metaphorically, it is a “bullfight” organized slightly differently, in which “the crowd in the arena” figuring the masses of ignorant people and the public opinion are called to play a greater role, not to say a major role because political leaders and governments are democratically elected. The ruling elite of the attacked country are collectively tormented in diverse fashions that all aim to overwhelm, weaken morally, and demonize them in the nations they lead for justifying their “elimination” in the end. The methods are not numbered to stress a chronology in their uses, but only to make them easier to understand and to find them out when I will cite and comment them eventually. 1. All the following methods must be used in manners allowing their plausible denial at any time. This concern claims the rallying of third parties that must be individuals fit to act as opinion leaders, yet unaware of the real aims they serve. They and their actions must be promoted from distance through conventional and other more exotic media. The methods are 2. rallying the masses around causes designed to arouse passionate feelings, by opposition to discourses calling for reason. For causes based on a call for reason are poorly energetic, harder to promote with simple and easy-to-understand arguments, and difficult, therefore, to spread among the masses with a rapidity suitable to the action. Then as the nature of the cause may be either positive (“for”) or negative (“against”), the preference must be given to the latter because it thus calls for a violence necessary for the expected commitment to occur. Arousing thoughtless feelings of passion among the masses expected to turn against their elite is a cardinal rule in influence, agitprop, and disinformation. 3. The facts of the negative cause may be very various, either true or false, or mixing the two possibilities, extracted from biographies, political or economic records of the targeted elite, regardless. When the facts are truths, their importance must be highlighted enough to appear as greater than they objectively are. Therefore, the facts can be found down to trivialities that did not arouse interest hitherto, such as common inclinations and little vices, slips of the tongue, selected excerpts in speeches and published papers, and so on. Using fallacies must be avoided preferably yet not altogether, and in any case, they must be alluded or presented as “highly probable” only and not as certainties since they can be disproved. As the premises supporting them are missing or flimsy, their promotion must be more intense than if they were facts, so that their repetition alone instills doubt in the mind of the masses. This is an alternative, whose second option consists in spreading largely and a fast frequency a score of humiliating fallacies and unflattering facts, which each may be of minor importance in truth since they are common in everybody. As the triviality of such negative messages in itself questions the effort that must be done to check the validity of each, their multiplication and frequency come as a potent additional deterrent. Likewise, the attacked party is quickly overwhelmed in its possible attempt to disprove them all one by one. Additionally, the method relies on the popular byword and fallacy saying, “there cannot be smoke without fire,” owing to the credit accorded to the sole repetition of a message—to which, as a matter of fact, ordinary advertising owes its effectiveness. 4. Strong emphases added on negative facts transform them into strong arguments. Indeed, the effort in a campaign of disinformation must focus on the added emphasis rather than on the facts themselves, since their real importance often would be minor enough to be disproportionate to the claims, if presented in a neutral fashion. In this endeavor, the more popular the media that spread the facts are, the greater the emphasis given to their negative nature is, and the lesser the masses doubt their validity. 5. All positive facts about the attacked party must be ignored / dismissed rather than challenged. Challenging positive facts is also making them better known than they are already, thus promoting their authors by the same occasion. 6. Creating toxic” friends and allies to the attacked party by finding out for this third parties having images and notorieties the masses perceive negatively; or else finding out such third parties claiming closeness in values, opinions, and ideas with the attacked party (i.e. demonization by association). Treating the result with the method 4. 7. Arranging and recording “toxic meetings” with the attacked party in order to produce from them material evidences supporting either a fact or a fallacy regardless. The evidences that may be pictures, videos, audio records, or even mails must be authentic and even not just falsified; yet the true cause of their existence may be changed for another, if it is not similarly evidenced. In any case, the purpose of this type of material evidence is to arouse doubt and / or to support rumors about anything is clashing with the scale of values of the masses, ranging from sex, corruption, collusion, exotic political or religious ideas or beliefs, disputable statements or stance, posture with respect to moral, and similar. Treating the result with the method 4. 8. Driving morally the targeted party into “a corner” or creating a situation aiming to elicit a fast response, therefore likely not to have been weighed enough to suffer ulterior criticisms, in order to transform it into an evidence supporting either a fact or a fallacy, regardless, and then treating it with the method 4. The objective of the methods above obviously is to bring about political changes in a target country. The next methods 9. to 18. are relevant to information warfare and to cultural influence in particular, whose common objective limits to an aggression that can be described in short as “war of emotional attrition”. For it comes generally as an initiatory stage setting ground for the ulterior use of the methods 1. to 8. above. Notwithstanding, as the use of the methods 9. to 18. resumes advantageously in support to the latter, the reverse is not true because this would prove fruitless in a country where the masses have not been morally weakened enough to be receptive to a call for a political change / takeover. Formally speaking, the set of methods 1. to 8. serves the attack, and the methods 9. to 18. are subsumed in a type of mission again named sensibilisation, in French, or “awareness raising”. 9. Overall, the main objective of this second set of methods limits to sowing and breeding doubt in the minds of the masses about everything they perceive positively about their country and its scale of values, yet not necessarily about their feelings for their elite. Therefore, it is not yet about making the masses endorsing a cause against their elite, but undermining their confidence about their country and its core values up to the point of making them feeling less safe and comfortable than they were heretofore. In turn, the ill feelings must gradually evolve toward incredulity and then doubt, with a focus on the latter assumptions since the goal is to prepare them to the acceptance of new values. 10. Challenging and questioning the scale of values of the masses of the target country through persistent and various actions of cultural influence—largely explained in their principles in this book and in the next chapter in particular. 11. Breeding doubt among the masses about facts and news by insisting on the negative perception anyone may have of them when so. Putting an emphasis on true negative news or hyping or publishing those that are poorly or not at all reported in the attacked country (i.e. awareness raising). Doing the same with positive facts and news about other countries, their cultures, and scales of values, all having in common to challenging those of the target country (i.e. importing foreign white propaganda). Overt black propaganda must be avoided altogether because success with the method largely relies on subtle disinformation, information dosage, and fuzzy logic. 12. Sowing discord among the masses by dividing them into minorities over latent or still inchoate issues, and designing others, suitable to the objective of the operation (i.e. awareness raising). The issues may be of minor importance or even imagined, regardless, because here the objective limits to question the core national and cultural values that together bring about a feeling of unity among the masses. Preferably, however, the worrying issues must have in common to be or to appear to be caused passively or actively by the ruling elite, its current politics, rules, and regulations. Thus, each of the minorities and their respective claims breed inescapably together a common discontent toward the elite and its current politics, rules, and regulations, pointed out as the only responsible for it. Implicitly, the recurrent characteristic transforms into a rallying call uniting all minorities into a new majority or influential minority at least. 13. Infiltrating permanently the political parties of the attacked country with a focus on the most popular and on those whose popularities are rising. The political colors of the parties to be infiltrated are unimportant because the goal is to secure in it a capacity in influence over politics, public services, and the military, once one of them will be in power or is already in power. “Moderately extremist” parties (i.e. far-right and far-left) are of particular interest due to their greater dynamism, and because of the easy reversibility of their programs and of the stances of their grass rooters. Far-extremist parties and their hardliners are of poor interest because they attract small minorities only, whose typical idiosyncratic members are intrinsically unable to access positions of responsibilities and power. 14. Whenever possible, founding new political parties, associations, labor unions, and liberal masonic grand lodges and lodges in the attacked country by recruiting its citizens having profiles suitable to the objective of the operation. Recruiting or helping discreetly leaders of minority parties, associations, and labor unions already established and having views that are clashing with the dominant values of the attacked country. Herein the goal is to use them as media / proxies voicing messages consistent with the objective of the operation, and relaying an action of disinformation similar in its form to this earlier described in the methods 1. to 8. Whenever possible, a particular attention must be accorded to women because they are statistically more receptive (more than 50% in all countries) than men are to the call for passion when the myth and its narrative preach progressive values. 15. Spotting public servants whose views / stances may serve the attack and help them rise in their respective hierarchies whenever possible. Doing the same with others having positions and professional notorieties because those are natural opinion leaders (e.g. experts, politicians, senior officials, religious leaders, scientists, journalists, artists, etc.). The main characteristics of interest to be considered in those people are consistency and strength in their beliefs. In this respect, women preferably young and handsome are recruits of greater interest due to their superior ability to seduce—as advertising demonstrates this regularly, actually. Moreover, when committing to a cause, women often prove more pugnacious than men are. Independently of genre, looking for an additional minority of recruits who are visibly native of third-world countries or their descendants because of their natural capacity to inhibit indigenous opponents in Western countries—lest of accusations of racism or xenophobia that always prove potent means of defense causing further inhibition / inaction in their opponents (i.e. enforced political correctness). 16. In universities, spotting talents whose views / stances may serve the attack, and helping those accessing positions of interest with respect to the objective. When possible and generally, penetrating and influencing the educational system of the target country with a focus on the schools and universities the elite favor. 17. Note that the types of individuals mentioned in the methods 1., 14., 15., and 16. must not be recruited as conscious agents, but only helped unbeknownst to them in all ways serving the objective, in order to shelter them against suspicions of collusion, espionage, and foreign interference. Therefore, interactions with them must never be direct (i.e. working them through screens) and must limit, in detail, to manipulations, anonymous helps, promotions in the media and by other means. Moreover, influencing them must be avoided because they must be shortlisted according to the quality and strength of their natural opinions, precisely. For the record, (1) the best agent is someone who ignores he is one; (2) one must never try to change the ideas and beliefs of someone shortlisted for this type of mission, and must find instead how to put them in the service of the objective. 18. In general, arousing doubt among the masses about the dominant scale of values, and resentment among already existing minorities toward the elite / establishment, to thus making them natural allies in the attack to come (materializing as the methods 1. to 8.). The silent frustrations of minorities must be aroused enough to give rise to spoken claims (i.e. awareness raising). In this goal, identifying all natural social and cultural minorities, and influencing them into turning their identities and characteristics into myths and corresponding narratives and claims, which together must constitute the formal aims of the attack to come. For the record, all societies are made of minorities, and arousing resentment in each against the scale of values of the majority makes them together a new majority, as explained in the method 12., yet all along unaware of the real aims they thus serve.