The protests were never about Ottawa. They were about the bridges.

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>The next two years are going to be interesting. We might crash and burn by the end of it, if not sooner.

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The next two years are going to be interesting. We might crash and burn by the end of it, if not sooner.

Not even 2 years.

18-21 months at the furthest extent.

All you do is look at each category of predictions you make. Track your accuracy as it relates to the individual decision makers, and that tells you how accurately you've gauged and modelled their decision making processes.

Then you look at the lead time versus your predicted time, to correct the bias in your own estimates.

I have a pretty good handle on the GOP, a decent handle on the russians, and am still learning to predict the DNC which can be all over the place in the direction it takes sometimes.

In no particular order I saw bojo for the scum he was, knew the direction australia would take, predicted swizerlands moves in relation to covid19, and thought I had a decent handle on poland but they've surprised me on a few key issues.

Hungary has not surprised me, and neither has Kazakhstans response to the CIA-lead coup there.

China I'm starting to have a better understanding of, and India I've started to look into as well.

Iran is a tiger that plays all sides but is obviously gunning for a new seat at a new sort of table, and sees the falling away of Turkey, and the afghan withdrawal, as an opportunity to cement itself as a powerbroker or at least stumbling block for any interlocutors, but they obviously don't want to become the next libya.

Israel is going for broke with its lobbies in western nations, predicting the asset bubble collapse will cause them to lose influence anyway, so they see no reason to hold back.

And finally, Germany sees the u.s. and petrodollar as failing before long, and doesn't want to be the first in the european sphere to call it.

The nat gas issue isn't about european energy supplies at all.

If the u.s. government understood what is really happening with the nordstream agreement, there wouldnt be "cold war" and "rumors of war"--

There would be full on war, within the week., openly between the u.s. and russia, instead of through proxies.

Because what is happening isn't europe and germany playing both sides, or vying for reliable energy supplies.

It's not even them bucking u.s. vassalage.

What this is, is none other than a margin call on the very legitimacy of the USD petro-dollar scheme itself.

And the u.s. is completely missing the forest for the trees.

If china really does control the administration (along with their u.k. and israeli allies), what they don't realize is they've already won. And germany and the ukraine refusing to fight or side with the u.s. is the bell-weather.

And it's all over except the fighting.

What they don't grasp is they've overdone it, and have cut their own throat before formalizing control over taiwan. And control of the u.s. government doesn't count here, because they still don't fully control the pentagon, which can still respond to any unilateral move against the RoC, and will do so rather than their failure to respond putting a nail in the coffin of the petrodollar and SWIFT scheme. China is likewise forced to act, and here why.

Trump's economic blockade forced this on them, so by extension, israel forced it on china.

China moved too soon on the issue, as did the WEF in the broader plot.

"Zugzwang" as it were.

> The next two years are going to be interesting. We might crash and burn by the end of it, if not sooner. Not even 2 years. 18-21 months at the furthest extent. All you do is look at each category of predictions you make. Track your accuracy as it relates to the individual decision makers, and that tells you how accurately you've gauged and modelled their decision making processes. Then you look at the lead time versus your predicted time, to correct the bias in your own estimates. I have a pretty good handle on the GOP, a decent handle on the russians, and am still learning to predict the DNC which can be all over the place in the direction it takes sometimes. In no particular order I saw bojo for the scum he was, knew the direction australia would take, predicted swizerlands moves in relation to covid19, and thought I had a decent handle on poland but they've surprised me on a few key issues. Hungary has not surprised me, and neither has Kazakhstans response to the CIA-lead coup there. China I'm starting to have a better understanding of, and India I've started to look into as well. Iran is a tiger that plays all sides but is obviously gunning for a new seat at a new sort of table, and sees the falling away of Turkey, and the afghan withdrawal, as an opportunity to cement itself as a powerbroker or at least stumbling block for any interlocutors, but they obviously don't want to become the next libya. Israel is going for broke with its lobbies in western nations, predicting the asset bubble collapse will cause them to lose influence anyway, so they see no reason to hold back. And finally, Germany sees the u.s. and petrodollar as failing before long, and doesn't want to be the first in the european sphere to call it. The nat gas issue isn't about european energy supplies at all. If the u.s. government understood what is really happening with the nordstream agreement, there wouldnt be "cold war" and "rumors of war"-- There would be *full on war, within the week.*, openly between the u.s. and russia, instead of through proxies. Because what is happening isn't europe and germany playing both sides, or vying for reliable energy supplies. It's not even them bucking u.s. vassalage. What this is, is none other than a *margin call on the very legitimacy of the USD petro-dollar scheme itself*. And the u.s. is completely missing the forest for the trees. If china really does control the administration (along with their u.k. and israeli allies), what they don't realize is they've already won. And germany and the ukraine refusing to fight or side with the u.s. is the bell-weather. And it's all over except the fighting. What they don't grasp is they've overdone it, and have cut their own throat *before* formalizing control over taiwan. And control of the u.s. government doesn't count here, because they still don't fully control the pentagon, which can still respond to any unilateral move against the RoC, and will do so rather than their failure to respond putting a nail in the coffin of the petrodollar and SWIFT scheme. China is likewise forced to act, and here why. Trump's economic blockade forced this on them, so by extension, israel forced it on china. China moved too soon on the issue, as did the WEF in the broader plot. "Zugzwang" as it were.

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>No arguments from me, my guess was a hopeful estimation honestly. The USA wants a big distraction and keeps poking a stick at Russia to goad them into Ukraine. I see China going into Taiwan if Russsia gets pestered into the Ukraiine.

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The USA wants a big distraction and keeps poking a stick at Russia to goad them into Ukraine.

I've actually changed my outlook on this scenario. I think whats happening is the same as the domestic narrative used here in the u.s: don't fight back, thats what they want!

The u.s. wants that message to spread to russia, because the u.s. basically knows it would be a losing fight (just from looking at the logistics of such a war). And the greatest indicator of that is that we pulled up stakes in afghanistan, and repositioned assets in poland. Why?

Because we don't think we can take the russians as-is. The military doesn't believe that anyway. And our forces in poland are meant to be a backstop so if or when fighting kicks off, and e get our asses kicked, russia doesn't take "more than its been given" so to speak.

This seems contradictory though, doesn't it? Why would the u.s. simultenously want a war, but try to discourage russia from interfering?

And thats kind of what clued me into it. The only way it makes sense is if two separate factions in the u.s. have two opposing goals here.

One (the polituburo, all the institutions, and officials and their lobbyists) want a war, and doesn't care about the outcome, the other (the pentagon probably) doesn't because it believes it can't win and if a hotwar takes place it will disrupt the existing gravy train. They've rightly estimated a coldwar would be more profitable and expansive to their authority than anything else, and that the other options aren't new opportunities, but really just undue risks versus the profit potential comparatively speaking.

Disregarding the factions issue, let me repeat myself:

This seems contradictory though, doesn't it? Why would the u.s. simultenously want a war, but try to discourage russia from interfering?

Is that the sort of strategy employed by a regime that thinks it can win?

No. So the conclusion must be it doesn't think it can win. So those who want to keep russia out, want to scare it with the international equivalent of the known domestic playbook "don't fight back! It's what they want!"

It's a bluff and I feel stupid for not having seen it sooner.

Worse, the russins, because they have bought the bluff, or an element of them have, will wait until the u.s. itself decides when the war is to start. The u.s. will then get to decide 1. how the event is framed, 2. "why" the russians did it, 3. what kind of event, 4. the demographics and number of casualties (in order to demonize the russians), 5. will lead the charge to turn others against russia. It gets its internal distraction, and a new renewed push against an external ally.

yes, I've changed my determination of this scenario, and now think it is probably foolish for the russians not to act to start the war themselves: If they act, they get to decide 1. where, 2. when, 3. how, 4. who gets hurt and who doesn't, 5. can minimize causalities in order to appeal to the international stage, 6. and control in what light they will be framed. They'll control what journalists are on the ground, what imagery is shown, and thus be first in the critical "golden hours" after the war starts--first to decide the very first impression everyone has of their actions--instead of doing nothing and waiting for us americans to decide "how the russians started the war."

Yes, it is a bad position to be, damned if you don't, damned if you do. But the russians will be worse off if they allow us americans to start the war in russia's name, because how ever us americans decide to start the war, will be pinned on them, e.s.p atrocity propaganda.

I am certain of these conclusions.

On the domestic front, what is happening, is that the regime, lead in this case by the kabuki american left, has every reason to start a losing war.

Heres why:

as we lose, more and more, it justifies ever-greater expansion of the state back home to "provision every man and women, every resource for the expanding war effort"
an illicit sale of contentious control over ukraine or any territory, can be effectively papered over as a "loss of territory" in a war. And this is not outside the u.s. regime's M.O. Not at all. In fact, "gaining ground by losing" is one of the number one tactics used domestically on policy issues, between the so-called parties (regime fronts).
Loss of ukraine and other territories pull double duty, because if the regime expect to lose control to decentralization trends over the next 5, 10, or 20 years, then the loss of these territories allows them to have an illicit operations (drug manufacturing, weapons, bioweapons, human trafficking, money laundering, spy hubs), covered up and destroyed. At minimum if it comes to light, they can claim plausible deniability back in the u.s, e.x. "its obviously propaganda by the enemy who only discovered these operations after they took over, how convenient!"

The trend of the pentagon losing control to the economic bloc of the united states (WEF et al) is accelerating, and we can reasonably conclude in ten years time, if not in three, the pentagon will be neutered not only by replacement of its officials, but by identification and replacement of its 'shadow' or private officials, those internal policy and decision makers not duly electing, except by the pentagon's own internal interests and concerns.

And then, one way or another, we will have a war, either domestically, or on russias doorstep, and we will lose.

> The USA wants a big distraction and keeps poking a stick at Russia to goad them into Ukraine. I've actually changed my outlook on this scenario. I think whats happening is the same as the domestic narrative used here in the u.s: *don't fight back, thats what they want!* The u.s. wants that message to spread to russia, because the u.s. basically knows it would be a losing fight (just from looking at the logistics of such a war). And the greatest indicator of that is that we pulled up stakes in afghanistan, and repositioned assets in poland. Why? Because we don't think we can take the russians as-is. The military doesn't believe that anyway. And our forces in poland are meant to be a *backstop* so if or when fighting kicks off, and e get our asses kicked, russia doesn't take "more than its been given" so to speak. This seems contradictory though, doesn't it? Why would the u.s. simultenously want a war, but try to discourage russia from interfering? And thats kind of what clued me into it. The only way it makes sense is if two separate factions in the u.s. have two opposing goals here. One (the polituburo, all the institutions, and officials and their lobbyists) *want* a war, and doesn't care about the outcome, the other (the pentagon probably) *doesn't* because it believes it can't win and if a hotwar takes place it will disrupt the existing gravy train. They've rightly estimated a coldwar would be more profitable and expansive to their authority than anything else, and that the other options aren't new opportunities, but really just undue risks versus the profit potential comparatively speaking. Disregarding the factions issue, let me repeat myself: This seems contradictory though, doesn't it? Why would the u.s. simultenously want a war, but try to discourage russia from interfering? Is that the sort of strategy employed by a regime that thinks it can win? No. So the conclusion must be it doesn't think it can win. So those who want to keep russia out, want to scare it with the international equivalent of the known domestic playbook "*don't fight back! It's what they want!*" It's a bluff and I feel stupid for not having seen it sooner. Worse, the russins, because they have bought the bluff, or an element of them have, will wait until the *u.s. itself* decides when the war is to start. The u.s. will then get to decide 1. how the event is framed, 2. "why" the russians did it, 3. what kind of event, 4. the demographics and number of casualties (in order to demonize the russians), 5. will lead the charge to turn others against russia. It gets its internal distraction, and a new renewed push against an external ally. yes, I've changed my determination of this scenario, and now think it is probably foolish for the russians not to act to start the war themselves: If they act, they get to decide 1. where, 2. when, 3. how, 4. who gets hurt and who doesn't, 5. can minimize causalities in order to appeal to the international stage, 6. and control in what light they will be framed. They'll control what journalists are on the ground, what imagery is shown, and thus be **first** in the **critical "golden hours"** after the war starts--first to decide the very **first impression** everyone has of their actions--instead of doing nothing and waiting for us americans to decide "how the russians started the war." Yes, it is a bad position to be, damned if you don't, damned if you do. But the russians will be worse off if they allow us americans to start the war in *russia's name*, because *how ever us americans* decide to start the war, *will* be pinned on them, e.s.p atrocity propaganda. I am certain of these conclusions. On the domestic front, what is happening, is that the regime, lead in this case by the kabuki american left, has every reason to start a losing war. Heres why: 1. as we lose, more and more, it justifies ever-greater expansion of the state back home to "provision every man and women, every resource for the expanding war effort" 2. an illicit *sale* of contentious control over ukraine or any territory, can be effectively papered over as a "loss of territory" in a war. And this is not outside the u.s. regime's M.O. Not at all. In fact, "gaining ground by losing" is one of the number one tactics used domestically on policy issues, between the so-called parties (regime fronts). 3. Loss of ukraine and other territories pull double duty, because if the regime expect to lose control to decentralization trends over the next 5, 10, or 20 years, then the loss of these territories allows them to have an illicit operations (drug manufacturing, weapons, bioweapons, human trafficking, money laundering, spy hubs), covered up and destroyed. At minimum if it comes to light, they can claim plausible deniability back in the u.s, e.x. "*its obviously propaganda by the enemy who only discovered these operations after they took over, how convenient!*" The trend of the pentagon losing control to the economic bloc of the united states (WEF et al) is accelerating, and we can reasonably conclude in ten years time, if not in three, the pentagon will be neutered not only by replacement of its officials, but by identification and replacement of its 'shadow' or private officials, those internal policy and decision makers not duly electing, except by the pentagon's own internal interests and concerns. And then, one way or another, we will have a war, either domestically, or on russias doorstep, and we will lose.