Muzzies need expulsion at home first. Then we can work on cleansing the planet.
Muzzies need expulsion at home first. Then we can work on cleansing the planet.
•
2007
US
Muslim americans(https://files.catbox.moe/4bac0k.pdf), (https://pdfhost.io/v/MGqpaY0M0_muslimamericans.pdf), (https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=2f44f75569a1cafda28b5c28a77044d6)
Pg.7 Quote:
>Younger muslims in the united states are more likely than older muslim americans to express a strong sense of muslim identity, and they are much more likely to say that suicide bombings in defense of islam may be justified at least sometimes.
Pg.12 Quote:
>In addition, the survey reveals that younger american muslims - those under the age of 30 - are much more religiously observant and accepting of islamic extremism than older american muslims. Younger american muslims report attending mosque services more frequently than older muslims. and a higher percentage of younger american muslims consider themselves primarily muslim, rather than primarily american (60% vs. 41% among american muslims aged 30 and older). In addition, more than twice as many american muslims under 30 as older ones believe that suicide bombings can often or sometimes be justified in defense of islam (15% vs. 6%).
>This pattern of greater acceptance of suicide bombing among young american muslims is consistent with the results of the pew global attitudes project among muslims in britain, france, germany and spain. in contrast, surveys of muslims in the middle east and other parts of the world show no greater tolerance of suicide bombing among young people.
Pg.13
>Quote: Consistent with the views of muslims in other countries, fewer than half of muslim americans - regardless of age - accept the fact that groups of arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. Nnly four in ten say that groups of arabs were the masterminds of the attacks. about one-third (32%) express no opinion on who was behind the attacks, while 28% flatly refuse to believe that arabs directed the attacks.
>
Very religious muslim americans are less likely to believe that groups of arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks than less religious muslims. In addition, the survey finds that those who say suicide bombings in defense of islam can often or sometimes be justified are more disbelieving than others that arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks.
Pg.32 Quote:
>Regular mosque attendance is especially high among younger american muslims. Nearly half (51%) of muslims under age 30 say they attend at least once a week, compared with 36% of those aged 30-54 and only 26% of those 55 and older. but older muslims observe daily prayer somewhat more frequently. nearly two-thirds (64%) of those 55 and older say they pray every day, compared with 54% of muslims under 30.
Pg.37 Quote:
>The relationship between religious attendance and religious identity may partly explain why younger muslims are more likely to consider themselves muslims in the first place.
Pg.52 Quote:
>The view that the government should be involved in protecting morality is widely shared among muslim americans. both younger (61% of those under 30), older (56% of those 55 and older), native-born (54%) and foreign-born (63%) agree with the government's role in regulating morality. the view that the government should work to protect morality is especially common among newly arrived immigrants (69%).
Pg.57 Quote:
>In the united states, younger muslims are more likely than older muslims to say they do not believe arab groups were responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, among muslims under 30, 38% reject that arab groups were responsible for 9/11. by comparison, among muslims 55 and older, only 16% say arabs were not responsible for the attacks.
Pg.59 Quote:
>In the united states there are few differences on this issue among muslim ethnic groups, but age is an important factor. younger muslims in the united states are more willing to accept suicide bombings in defense of islam than their older counterparts. among muslims under 30, for example, 15% say suicide bombings may be justified often or sometimes (2% often, 13% sometimes), while nearly two-thirds (69%) say such tactics are never justified.
Pg.60 Quote:
>The higher levels of support for suicide bombing seen among young american muslims resemble patterns found among muslims in europe, where muslims also constitute a minority population. in britain, france and germany, muslims under the age of 30 are consistently the least likely to say that suicide bombings are never justified. in other words, the proportion who think suicide bombings against civilians can ever be justified, even if only rarely, is higher among those under 30 compared to those older. About a quarter (26%) of younger american muslims say suicide bombings can be justified at least rarely, 17 percentage points higher than the proportion of muslims 30 and older (9%) who share that view. the age gap is about the same in britain (18 percentage points), but somewhat narrower in germany (12 points), france (11 points) and spain (7 points).
2007
Muslims in Germany(https://files.catbox.moe/tudrbp) ,(https://pdfhost.io/v/TyxhGtcLg_001Umschlagps.pdf), (https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=84829da37cc8093686a9e432623e84b9)
Pg.50 Quotes:
>The results of several surveys conducted in great britain are available. The opinion research institute yougov was commissioned by the daily telegraph to survey 526 adult muslims between july 15 and 22, 2005, i.e. immediately after the london bombings of july 7, 2005. Their views on the attack, the perpetrators, the western social order, the credibility of british politics and their own behavior in the event of suspected religiously motivated attacks were surveyed. While 77% of respondents disapprove of the attacks, 56% say they can understand the behavior of the attackers. 44% do not believe that the perpetrators of the attacks would get a fair trial if arrested. 66% believe muslims have a responsibility to prevent these attacks. 73% said they would report potential killers to the police. on the other hand, 3% said they would not report them. Seventy percent were convinced that other muslims would report attacks to the police. when asked if they would report a cleric who attempted to radicalize young people, 10% responded negatively; only 47% would report such a cleric to the police.
>Moreover, while 81% declared themselves loyal to britain, 32% agreed that western society was decadent and immoral and should be changed, and 1% saw violence as a legitimate means to this end (king, 2006). These results should be interpreted under the aspect that the survey was conducted very close to the attacks of 07.07.2005. moreover, the validity of the survey is limited, as no control group of non-muslims was interviewed. One year later, yo ugov(2006) repeated this survey. in july 2006, 310 british muslims and 1,632 british non-muslims were interviewed. 73% of muslims and 83% of non-muslims agreed with the statement that it is never justified to target british civilians because of the war in iraq and afghanistan, while 7% of muslims and 13% of non-muslims disagreed with the statement. When asked if they were sympathetic to muslims waging a "holy war" against the west in light of events in iraq, afghanistan and palestine, 51% of muslims and 19% of non-muslims agreed. sixty-seven percent of non-muslims and 29% of muslims could not agree with this statement (yougov, 2006, p.3f.).
2011
Canadá
What do muslim canadians want?(https://files.catbox.moe/gn2ahw), (https://pdfhost.io/v/njUNTtL39_WhatDoMuslimCanadiansWantNovember12011.pdf), (https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=54ffd9a23d7397584ec9c53b056b6fdc)
Pg.13 quote:
>Survey respondents were asked questions involving two conventional islamist litmus tests—whether a pan-islamic caliphate27 should replace existing governments and, separately, whether sharia law should be introduced as an option or obligation for muslims. Respondents were divided on each of the two questions, with resistance to the establishment of a caliphate being stronger than resistance to the introduction of sharia law, as shown in tables 3a and b. The best evidence from these two tables in support of the assimilationist paradigm is that strong opposition to a caliphate outnumbers strong support for it by ten to one. Nonetheless, only 39% of respondents disagreed strongly with the idea of introducing a caliphate. Strong opposition rises to 50% among non-observant muslims while falling to 25% among muslims who attend islamic study groups at least once a month.
Pg.14 quote:
>Opinion on sharia is diverse, with a plurality of opinions in favor of sharia as an option available to muslims dealing with family law issues. Opposition to any room for sharia is strongest among non-observant muslims (40%) and immigrants from iran (44%), while it is weakest among arabs (15%) and regular mosque-goers (15%). Among non-observant muslims, 8% favor requiring muslims to submit to sharia courts in family or legal matters.
Pg.15 quote:
>Respondents were asked to rate their approval or disapproval of four muslim extremist groups, two non-muslim groups, and the iranian regime, as shown in table 4. The organization of the late osama bin laden is totally disliked by 65% (score of 1), totally supported by 1% (score of 7), and partially supported or tolerated by the remaining 34%. In contrast, canadian muslims relatively approve of the muslim brotherhood, which is rejected by only 13%. founded in egypt in 1928, it is dedicated to creating an islamic civilization inspired by the caliphates of the 7th and 8th centuries that subjugates women and subordinates non-believers. The intellectual inspiration for al qaeda, hamas and other more recent militant or terrorist organizations, the brotherhood has been involved in providing logistical support and money laundering on their behalf.28
quote:
>The degree of support for the brotherhood is noteworthy. overall support for the brotherhood31 is almost twice as high as unequivocal rejection (24% vs. 13%). the brotherhood's brand is so strong that support for the organization, whose belief system involves a sharia-based clericalism at its core, far outweighs support for sharia.
Pg.16 quote:
>Finally, another noteworthy finding is a very high rate of "don't know" responses, ranging from 65% in the case of the tamil tigers to 25% in the case of al qaeda. In the case of non-muslim terrorist organizations, a reasonable inference is that respondents do not know their views, either because they are unfamiliar with the group or because they have not reflected on their own assessments. in the case of muslim organizations, the high rate of "don't know" responses may be a way of signaling a discrete form of sympathy with the cause, though not necessarily with some of the media. Examples of islamist extremism receive extensive coverage in domestic and foreign media and should be familiar to respondents. it is therefore reasonable to infer that a considerable portion of the "don't know" responses are diplomatic expressions of middling support.
2007
US
**Muslim americans**(https://files.catbox.moe/4bac0k.pdf), (https://pdfhost.io/v/MGqpaY0M0_muslimamericans.pdf),
(https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=2f44f75569a1cafda28b5c28a77044d6)
Pg.7
Quote:
>>Younger muslims in the united states are more likely than older muslim americans to express a strong sense of muslim identity, and they are much more likely to say that suicide bombings in defense of islam may be justified at least sometimes.
Pg.12
Quote:
>>In addition, the survey reveals that younger american muslims - those under the age of 30 - are much more religiously observant and accepting of islamic extremism than older american muslims. Younger american muslims report attending mosque services more frequently than older muslims. and a higher percentage of younger american muslims consider themselves primarily muslim, rather than primarily american (60% vs. 41% among american muslims aged 30 and older). In addition, more than twice as many american muslims under 30 as older ones believe that suicide bombings can often or sometimes be justified in defense of islam (15% vs. 6%).
>>This pattern of greater acceptance of suicide bombing among young american muslims is consistent with the results of the pew global attitudes project among muslims in britain, france, germany and spain. in contrast, surveys of muslims in the middle east and other parts of the world show no greater tolerance of suicide bombing among young people.
Pg.13
>>Quote:
Consistent with the views of muslims in other countries, fewer than half of muslim americans - regardless of age - accept the fact that groups of arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. Nnly four in ten say that groups of arabs were the masterminds of the attacks. about one-third (32%) express no opinion on who was behind the attacks, while 28% flatly refuse to believe that arabs directed the attacks.
>>`Very religious muslim americans are less likely to believe that groups of arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks than less religious muslims. In addition, the survey finds that those who say suicide bombings in defense of islam can often or sometimes be justified are more disbelieving than others that arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. `
Pg.32
Quote:
>>Regular mosque attendance is especially high among younger american muslims. Nearly half (51%) of muslims under age 30 say they attend at least once a week, compared with 36% of those aged 30-54 and only 26% of those 55 and older. but older muslims observe daily prayer somewhat more frequently. nearly two-thirds (64%) of those 55 and older say they pray every day, compared with 54% of muslims under 30.
Pg.37
Quote:
>>The relationship between religious attendance and religious identity may partly explain why younger muslims are more likely to consider themselves muslims in the first place.
Pg.52
Quote:
>>The view that the government should be involved in protecting morality is widely shared among muslim americans. both younger (61% of those under 30), older (56% of those 55 and older), native-born (54%) and foreign-born (63%) agree with the government's role in regulating morality. the view that the government should work to protect morality is especially common among newly arrived immigrants (69%).
Pg.57
Quote:
>>In the united states, younger muslims are more likely than older muslims to say they do not believe arab groups were responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, among muslims under 30, 38% reject that arab groups were responsible for 9/11. by comparison, among muslims 55 and older, only 16% say arabs were not responsible for the attacks.
Pg.59
Quote:
>>In the united states there are few differences on this issue among muslim ethnic groups, but age is an important factor. younger muslims in the united states are more willing to accept suicide bombings in defense of islam than their older counterparts. among muslims under 30, for example, 15% say suicide bombings may be justified often or sometimes (2% often, 13% sometimes), while nearly two-thirds (69%) say such tactics are never justified.
Pg.60
Quote:
>>The higher levels of support for suicide bombing seen among young american muslims resemble patterns found among muslims in europe, where muslims also constitute a minority population. in britain, france and germany, muslims under the age of 30 are consistently the least likely to say that suicide bombings are never justified. in other words, the proportion who think suicide bombings against civilians can ever be justified, even if only rarely, is higher among those under 30 compared to those older. About a quarter (26%) of younger american muslims say suicide bombings can be justified at least rarely, 17 percentage points higher than the proportion of muslims 30 and older (9%) who share that view. the age gap is about the same in britain (18 percentage points), but somewhat narrower in germany (12 points), france (11 points) and spain (7 points).
2007
**Muslims in Germany**(https://files.catbox.moe/tudrbp) ,(https://pdfhost.io/v/TyxhGtcLg_001Umschlagps.pdf),
(https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=84829da37cc8093686a9e432623e84b9)
Pg.50
Quotes:
>>The results of several surveys conducted in great britain are available. The opinion research institute yougov was commissioned by the daily telegraph to survey 526 adult muslims between july 15 and 22, 2005, i.e. immediately after the london bombings of july 7, 2005. Their views on the attack, the perpetrators, the western social order, the credibility of british politics and their own behavior in the event of suspected religiously motivated attacks were surveyed. While 77% of respondents disapprove of the attacks, 56% say they can understand the behavior of the attackers. 44% do not believe that the perpetrators of the attacks would get a fair trial if arrested. 66% believe muslims have a responsibility to prevent these attacks. 73% said they would report potential killers to the police. on the other hand, 3% said they would not report them. Seventy percent were convinced that other muslims would report attacks to the police. when asked if they would report a cleric who attempted to radicalize young people, 10% responded negatively; only 47% would report such a cleric to the police.
>>Moreover, while 81% declared themselves loyal to britain, 32% agreed that western society was decadent and immoral and should be changed, and 1% saw violence as a legitimate means to this end (king, 2006). These results should be interpreted under the aspect that the survey was conducted very close to the attacks of 07.07.2005. moreover, the validity of the survey is limited, as no control group of non-muslims was interviewed. One year later, yo ugov(2006) repeated this survey. in july 2006, 310 british muslims and 1,632 british non-muslims were interviewed. 73% of muslims and 83% of non-muslims agreed with the statement that it is never justified to target british civilians because of the war in iraq and afghanistan, while 7% of muslims and 13% of non-muslims disagreed with the statement. When asked if they were sympathetic to muslims waging a "holy war" against the west in light of events in iraq, afghanistan and palestine, 51% of muslims and 19% of non-muslims agreed. sixty-seven percent of non-muslims and 29% of muslims could not agree with this statement (yougov, 2006, p.3f.).
2011
Canadá
**What do muslim canadians want?**(https://files.catbox.moe/gn2ahw), (https://pdfhost.io/v/njUNTtL39_WhatDoMuslimCanadiansWantNovember12011.pdf),
(https://www.pdfhost.net/index.php?Action=Download&File=54ffd9a23d7397584ec9c53b056b6fdc)
Pg.13
quote:
>>Survey respondents were asked questions involving two conventional islamist litmus tests—whether a pan-islamic caliphate27 should replace existing governments and, separately, whether sharia law should be introduced as an option or obligation for muslims. Respondents were divided on each of the two questions, with resistance to the establishment of a caliphate being stronger than resistance to the introduction of sharia law, as shown in tables 3a and b. The best evidence from these two tables in support of the assimilationist paradigm is that strong opposition to a caliphate outnumbers strong support for it by ten to one. Nonetheless, only 39% of respondents disagreed strongly with the idea of introducing a caliphate. Strong opposition rises to 50% among non-observant muslims while falling to 25% among muslims who attend islamic study groups at least once a month.
Pg.14
quote:
>>Opinion on sharia is diverse, with a plurality of opinions in favor of sharia as an option available to muslims dealing with family law issues. Opposition to any room for sharia is strongest among non-observant muslims (40%) and immigrants from iran (44%), while it is weakest among arabs (15%) and regular mosque-goers (15%). Among non-observant muslims, 8% favor requiring muslims to submit to sharia courts in family or legal matters.
Pg.15
quote:
>>Respondents were asked to rate their approval or disapproval of four muslim extremist groups, two non-muslim groups, and the iranian regime, as shown in table 4. The organization of the late osama bin laden is totally disliked by 65% (score of 1), totally supported by 1% (score of 7), and partially supported or tolerated by the remaining 34%. In contrast, canadian muslims relatively approve of the muslim brotherhood, which is rejected by only 13%. founded in egypt in 1928, it is dedicated to creating an islamic civilization inspired by the caliphates of the 7th and 8th centuries that subjugates women and subordinates non-believers. The intellectual inspiration for al qaeda, hamas and other more recent militant or terrorist organizations, the brotherhood has been involved in providing logistical support and money laundering on their behalf.28
quote:
>>The degree of support for the brotherhood is noteworthy. overall support for the brotherhood31 is almost twice as high as unequivocal rejection (24% vs. 13%). the brotherhood's brand is so strong that support for the organization, whose belief system involves a sharia-based clericalism at its core, far outweighs support for sharia.
Pg.16
quote:
>>Finally, another noteworthy finding is a very high rate of "don't know" responses, ranging from 65% in the case of the tamil tigers to 25% in the case of al qaeda. In the case of non-muslim terrorist organizations, a reasonable inference is that respondents do not know their views, either because they are unfamiliar with the group or because they have not reflected on their own assessments. in the case of muslim organizations, the high rate of "don't know" responses may be a way of signaling a discrete form of sympathy with the cause, though not necessarily with some of the media. Examples of islamist extremism receive extensive coverage in domestic and foreign media and should be familiar to respondents. it is therefore reasonable to infer that a considerable portion of the "don't know" responses are diplomatic expressions of middling support.
(post is archived)