>Claremont Institute scholars, including me, Ed Erler, Tom West, John Marini, and Michael Anton, President Trump’s incoming Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, have been contending for years—decades, really—that the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not provide automatic citizenship for everyone born on U.S. soil, no matter the circumstances. Other prominent scholars, such as the late University of Texas law Professor Lino Graglia, University of Pennsylvania Professor Rogers Smith, and Yale Law Professor Emeritus Peter Schuck, have come to the same conclusion based on their own extensive scholarly research. >Claremont scholars have made the argument in books, law review articles, congressional testimony, and legal briefs. President Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General, Edwin Meese, even joined one of those briefs, in which we argued against treating enemy combatant Yaser Esam Hamdi as a citizen merely because he had been born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, while his father was working in the U.S. on a temporary work visa. Perhaps as a result of our brief in that case, the late Justice Antonin Scalia referred to Hamdi as a “presumed citizen” in his dissenting opinion. >Our argument is straightforward. The text of the 14th Amendment contains two requirements for acquiring automatic citizenship by birth: one must be born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. The proper understanding of the Citizenship Clause therefore turns on what the drafters of the amendment, and those who ratified it, meant by “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Was it merely a partial, temporary jurisdiction, such as applies to anyone (except for diplomats) who are subject to our laws while they are within our borders? Or does it instead apply only to those who are subject to a more complete jurisdiction, one which manifests itself as owing allegiance to the United States and not to any foreign power? >Think of it this way. Someone from Great Britain visiting the United States is subject to our laws while here, which is to say subject to our partial or territorial jurisdiction. He must drive on the right-hand side of the road rather than the left, for example. But he does not thereby owe allegiance to the United States; he is not subject to being drafted into our army; and he cannot be prosecuted for treason (as opposed to ordinary violations of law) if he takes up arms against the United States, for he has breached no oath of allegiance. >So which understanding of “subject to the jurisdiction” did the drafters of the 14th Amendment have in mind? >Happily, we don’t need to speculate, as they were asked that very question. **They unambiguously stated that it meant “complete” jurisdiction, such as existed under the law at the time, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which excluded from citizenship those born on U.S. soil who were “subject to a foreign power.”** . . [Archive](https://archive.today/65Kgb) - still in long queue when posted.