>Our Supreme Court has historically afforded an expansive application to the Unruh Act, holding at "the 'identification of particular bases of discrimination--color, race, religion, ancestry and national origin--... is illustrative rather than restrictive.'" (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 1. 30 Cal.3d 1 , 732.) The court has declared to this end that the act possesses "a clear and large design to interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise." (In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205 at p. 212; see also, Marina Point, Lt v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 733.) Moreover, the court's broad application of the act has received consistent legislative approval. (See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, at p. 734.) In light of this history we may not presume that the Legislature in enacting the mobilehome statutes before us intended to overthrow long established principles of law in the absence of clear and persuasive evidence by way of express legislative declaration or by necessary implication. (Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 16 Cal.3d at 7.) Plaintiff has adduced no such evidence. See Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386 invalidating a lender policy of, "No home loans if day care involved." And the Supreme Court has previously made clear that the listing of the particular bases for discrimination in Civil Code section 51 "is illustrative rather than [151 Cal.App.4th 1405] restrictive. [Citation.]" ( In re Cox (1970) 1. 3 Cal.3d 205 , 216 ( Cox ).) Thus, in Cox , the high court concluded that the Unruh Act prohibited a business's arbitrary exclusion of a customer on the ground that he associated with a male with long hair and unconventional dress. ( Ibid. ) Similarly, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 , 740 ( Marina Point ), the court held that a blanket policy of excluding children or families with children from rental housing constituted discrimination under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that those groups were not specifically enumerated in the statute. (See also O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 ( O'Connor ) [holding that a condominium development restricting residency to persons over 18 violated Unruh Act].) >In Harris , supra , 52 Cal.3d 1142 , the Supreme Court revisited whether discrimination based upon characteristics not specifically enumerated in Civil Code section 51 was potentially proscribed under the Unruh Act. After extensive discussion (see Harris , supra , at pp. 1154-1156), the court rejected the defendants' position that only classes specifically identified in the statute were protected. The Harris court acknowledged that "[b]eginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. [Citations.]" ( Id. at p. 1155.) It therefore rejected the defendants' contention that the Legislature had repudiated the holdings in " Cox , Marina Point , O'Connor , and similar appellate decisions extending the Unruh Act beyond its specified categories of discrimination . . . ." ( Id. at p. 1156.) The Supreme Court, in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824 , 840 ( Koebke ), reiterated that in Harris , supra , it had "affirmed the principle articulated in [its] earlier decisions that the Act's enumerated categories are illustrative, rather than restrictive." It explained that Harris had established a "a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim for discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the Act." ( Ibid. ) Although the case was not mentioned by the Supreme Court, slightly over a year before Harris was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Division Three) held that a police officer had stated a claim for discrimination under the Unruh Act on the basis of his occupational status. In Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 ( Long ), the plaintiff, a police officer, attended a public meeting sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that concerned police practices. ( Id. at p. 1291.) After being ejected by an ACLU attorney, the plaintiff brought suit for damages, alleging, inter alia, a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. ( Id. at p. 1293.) The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the Unruh Act based upon arbitrary occupational-status discrimination, and it rejected the defendants' assertion that speech alone (i.e., words uttered ejecting the plaintiff) was not actionable. The court stated: "[A]n announcement such as 'You can't eat at my diner because you are a lawyer, bricklayer, female, or Indian chief' would be actionable under the Unruh Act, although words alone were the means employed to effect the unlawful discrimination." ( Id. at p. 1297; see also McCalden v. California Library Ass'n (9th Cir. 1990) 955 F.2d 1214. 1221 [noting that protected classes under the Unruh Act have been broadly defined to include, inter alia, "students, families with children, welfare recipients, and occupational groups"].) Moreover, the court disposed of the defendants' argument that police officers were not entitled to protection under the Act, holding that "they are as much entitled to the protections of the Unruh Act as any other citizen. They may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apartment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occupation, whether working a shift or on vacation." ( Long, supra, at p. 1298; see also id. at p. 1300 [citing other hypothetical examples of prohibited occupational-status discrimination by car rental agency, restaurateur, and transportation company].) >[9] Moreover, Roth did not repudiate the holding in Long , supra , 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , that the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary occupational discrimination. Indeed, the Roth court neither cited Long nor held categorically that the Act does not protect against any form of occupational-status discrimination. (See Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108 , 118: " 'Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood [151 Cal.App.4th 1409] in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.' ") We therefore conclude that Roth is distinguishable from the circumstances before us and does not compel the conclusion that Sisemore has failed to state a claim under the Act. [10] " 'The purpose [of the Unruh Act] is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the particular service offered . . .' " by an organization or entity covered by the act. ( Marina Point, supra , 30 Cal.3d at p. 738; see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712 , 733.) As the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he Act is to be given a liberal construction with a view to effectuating its purposes. [Citations.]" ( Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 , 28; see also Angelucci v. Century Supper Club , supra , ___ Cal.4th at p.___ [2007 WL 1557339, at p. *2].) We conclude that a finding here that Sisemore stated a viable Unruh Act claim for occupational discrimination is consistent both with the holding in Long and the statute's policy of prohibiting arbitrary denial of access to public accommodations. (Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 1. 131 Cal.App.3d 816 , 844 [182 Cal.Rptr. 813] [gated community could not discriminate among give- away newspapers]