The IDF claims a 90 percent success rate of the Iron Dome system in its latest operation against Hamas, dubbed “Guard of Walls.”
Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014 also made the same claim – 90 percent successful.
We went to check.
An IDF spokesman's statement summarizes Operation "Guard of Walls" as follows::
"During the course of the operation, approximately 4360 launch attempts were made towards the State of Israel, of which approximately 3400 crossed into the territory of the State of Israel, approximately 680 fell in the territory of the Gaza Strip and approximately 280 fell at sea.”
The obvious question is how the IDF calculated and reached those 90 percent that became part of the IDF's narrative.
We put a question to an IDF spokesman: How many rockets fell in built-up territory ?
The answer came a few days later: “The number of casualties in a built-up area during Operation Guard of Walls is 272. “ Presumably they thought carefully before answering.
On the face of it, to reach 90 percent interception, 2,720 rockets and mortars were to be attempted and intercepted, of which only 272 “slipped” and fell nonetheless in built-up areas, only protected by the Iron Dome system.
2720 intercept attempts against 3400 rockets (79 percent ) fired into Israel's entire territory.
On the eve of the second day of the operation, the IDF reported that as of this hour, some 480 launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory had been identified, as well as about 150 failed launches from the Gaza Strip. Air defense fighters intercepted about 200 launches
That means 200 of the 480 that have reached Israeli territory have been intercepted, which is about 42 percent.
The next day the report was: As of 6:00 a.m.: As of 6: 00 a.m. This morning, about 180 launches were detected from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. About 40 rockets landed in the Gaza Strip. Air defense fighters intercepted dozens of rockets under the policy
"Dozens" out of 180. Even if tens means 90, it is at most about 50 percent.
For the purposes of the debate, we'll take an average number of 45 percent.
From day three onwards, the IDF stopped giving figures of how many were intercepted.
The gap between the 79 percent of interception attempts required to come in with the 272 tackles and the 90 percent success rate, versus the 45 percent as actually done in the first two days of operation, suggests the figure of 272 is much lower than reality. The number of falls in a built-up area corresponding to 45 percent of intercept attempts is 477. Accordingly, the true success rate is not 90 percent but 51 percent.
Almog Ben Zachary of Haaretz newspaper reported from a meeting of the Knesset Foreign and Security Committee held on the third day of the operation, in which the head of the Home Front Command, Brigadier General Itzik Bar, gave remarks:
As of this morning, 1,369 launches since the start of the current campaign; 1,031 falls: of which 264 are on the ground. By comparison, the Rock Solid 4,000 launches over 50 days. This is 264 falls in a built-up area, 167 destruction events (including shrapnel, intercept fragments, etc.).
264 falls in a built-up area after just 3 days of operation, out of 10. I reached out to an IDF spokesman who settled the discrepancy with the 272 who had informed me about the whole operation. In a simple account, the number of casualties in a built-up area in all ten days of the operation should have been closer to 264 times 10/3 i.e. 880, more than three times what an IDF spokesman said. A spokesman for the Israeli Military said in a statement that Brigadier General Baer had been”confused “and was referring to attempts to launch into built-up areas. After 3 days I was informed that they had checked again and the Home Front Command confirmed that there had indeed been a mix-up....
My personal opinion: I have never heard of such a senior officer who prepared, and ended up getting confused in front of the Foreign and Security Committee, and in particular repeated the number 264 twice and also detailed what it caused.
In addition: If Brigadier General Barr was indeed referring to 264 launch attempts in three days, out of 1369 launches, then that is 19% of rockets attempted to intercept, because every launch attempt in a built-up area is met with an Iron Dome response. That number is not acceptable against the 45% average claimed by an IDF spokesman in the first two days of the operation, so my understanding is that the”confusion “was not and was not created. Conclusion: Brig. Gen. Itzik Bar, Chief of Staff of the Home Front Command, who is not among the IDF's spokespeople, is probably the only one who reported the truth.
Thus: If 272 falls in a built-up area, the official figure of the IDF spokesman, is equivalent to 90 percent success, then 880 falls, which Itzik Bar was supposed to report at the end of the operation, is equivalent to 28 percent success.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation from an IDF spokesman, I tried to understand for myself how it happens that the home Front command reports 3 times more falls in a built-up area than an IDF spokesman.
It is clear to all that the IDF is feeding off air defences, and their mutual interest is of course to glorify the performance of Iron Dome. The way to do this goes by the definition of “built-up area” or “populated area.” In terms of air defenses, whose interceptor system computer in most cases knows the exact fall location before the home front command gets there, can immediately check on its digital map whether that point contains immediate proximity, say within a 30-meter radius, structures or other facilities. If the answer is no, that fall falls into the “open spaces” category , even if it's in the middle of the city. All of this is probably done automatically by the computer. The determination of the computer can be manually updated later according to the damage reported by the Home Front Command. For example: If the rocket hit 10 meters from a building then a built-up area, if it entered the ground and exploded in the Yarkon Park it is an open area. If the shrapnel hit a single vehicle that happened to be parked there, then still an open area, but if 5 cars were hit then a built-up area, and so on.
In contrast, the Home Front Command makes the decision based solely on the area of impact. Either the entire area is included in the populated area defined in the maps, or not. So it is clear that the overall number of falls on the ground according to the Home Front Command will be many times greater.
Factually, the current IDF definition of a built-up area in terms of alerts and count of falls is according to the non-secret map with 1,700 warning areas that the Home Front Command has defined for all Israeli populated areas.
Conclusion: The Home Front Command is right on the count, an IDF spokesman playing with definitions and numbers…
The 28 percent success rate is not the end of the line: we have seen that the IDF spokesman does not provide true data on falls in built-up areas, we can continue to calculate for example what happens to the above efficiency percentages if the number of intercept attempts was not 2720 but around 1000 ( the Israeli INSS website that collected and compiled visible data reached a conclusion of 1100 ), 30 percent of the 3400 rockets that reached Israeli territory. It's reasonable and reasonable. For example, during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 with almost the same volume of rocket and mortar fire, the IDF carried out 800 interception tests.
880 tackles against 1,000 interceptions gives 12 percent success rate, not 28.
In summary, unlike Dr. Muti Schaefer who passionately argues that Iron Dome is one big hoax and doesn't shoot down anything, I think it does shoot down here and there, but much less than the 90 percent that is claimed. And then you have to understand that when efficiency drops below a certain threshold, there's no point in the whole system being up and running.
For all those convinced that Iron Dome saved hundreds of Israelis ' lives on the home front, the dry statistics show that it did not. According to the Shin Bet website, in Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, 4,600 rockets and mortars were fired, killing 13 people. In "Guard of Walls" after 12 years, 4,300 people were shot and 12 killed. Exactly the same lethality – one fatality for every 355 rockets. The only difference is that in 2008 there was still no Iron Dome.
An IDF spokesman said the enemy had improved over the years, and the death toll at the “Guard of Walls” demonstrated Iron Dome's high effectiveness. But it is hard to accept the “improvement” claim that a quarter of the rockets failed to leave Gaza or fell at sea, and only a third of those that did reach Israel were aimed at built-up areas. That means only 25 percent of the rockets threatened built-up territory, while built-up areas make up about 15 percent of Israel's total. The enemy therefore appeared to be "not improved" in its rocket fire. A little more deliberate than random statistical gunfire.
The IDF claims a 90 percent success rate of the Iron Dome system in its latest operation against Hamas, dubbed “Guard of Walls.”
Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014 also made the same claim – 90 percent successful.
We went to check.
An IDF spokesman's statement summarizes Operation "Guard of Walls" as follows::
"During the course of the operation, approximately 4360 launch attempts were made towards the State of Israel, of which approximately 3400 crossed into the territory of the State of Israel, approximately 680 fell in the territory of the Gaza Strip and approximately 280 fell at sea.”
The obvious question is how the IDF calculated and reached those 90 percent that became part of the IDF's narrative.
We put a question to an IDF spokesman: How many rockets fell in built-up territory ?
The answer came a few days later: “The number of casualties in a built-up area during Operation Guard of Walls is 272. “ Presumably they thought carefully before answering.
On the face of it, to reach 90 percent interception, 2,720 rockets and mortars were to be attempted and intercepted, of which only 272 “slipped” and fell nonetheless in built-up areas, only protected by the Iron Dome system.
2720 intercept attempts against 3400 rockets (79 percent ) fired into Israel's entire territory.
On the eve of the second day of the operation, the IDF reported that as of this hour, some 480 launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory had been identified, as well as about 150 failed launches from the Gaza Strip. Air defense fighters intercepted about 200 launches
That means 200 of the 480 that have reached Israeli territory have been intercepted, which is about 42 percent.
The next day the report was: As of 6:00 a.m.: As of 6: 00 a.m. This morning, about 180 launches were detected from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. About 40 rockets landed in the Gaza Strip. Air defense fighters intercepted dozens of rockets under the policy
"Dozens" out of 180. Even if tens means 90, it is at most about 50 percent.
For the purposes of the debate, we'll take an average number of 45 percent.
From day three onwards, the IDF stopped giving figures of how many were intercepted.
The gap between the 79 percent of interception attempts required to come in with the 272 tackles and the 90 percent success rate, versus the 45 percent as actually done in the first two days of operation, suggests the figure of 272 is much lower than reality. The number of falls in a built-up area corresponding to 45 percent of intercept attempts is 477. Accordingly, the true success rate is not 90 percent but 51 percent.
Almog Ben Zachary of Haaretz newspaper reported from a meeting of the Knesset Foreign and Security Committee held on the third day of the operation, in which the head of the Home Front Command, Brigadier General Itzik Bar, gave remarks:
As of this morning, 1,369 launches since the start of the current campaign; 1,031 falls: of which 264 are on the ground. By comparison, the Rock Solid 4,000 launches over 50 days. This is 264 falls in a built-up area, 167 destruction events (including shrapnel, intercept fragments, etc.).
264 falls in a built-up area after just 3 days of operation, out of 10. I reached out to an IDF spokesman who settled the discrepancy with the 272 who had informed me about the whole operation. In a simple account, the number of casualties in a built-up area in all ten days of the operation should have been closer to 264 times 10/3 i.e. 880, more than three times what an IDF spokesman said. A spokesman for the Israeli Military said in a statement that Brigadier General Baer had been”confused “and was referring to attempts to launch into built-up areas. After 3 days I was informed that they had checked again and the Home Front Command confirmed that there had indeed been a mix-up....
My personal opinion: I have never heard of such a senior officer who prepared, and ended up getting confused in front of the Foreign and Security Committee, and in particular repeated the number 264 twice and also detailed what it caused.
In addition: If Brigadier General Barr was indeed referring to 264 launch attempts in three days, out of 1369 launches, then that is 19% of rockets attempted to intercept, because every launch attempt in a built-up area is met with an Iron Dome response. That number is not acceptable against the 45% average claimed by an IDF spokesman in the first two days of the operation, so my understanding is that the”confusion “was not and was not created. Conclusion: Brig. Gen. Itzik Bar, Chief of Staff of the Home Front Command, who is not among the IDF's spokespeople, is probably the only one who reported the truth.
Thus: If 272 falls in a built-up area, the official figure of the IDF spokesman, is equivalent to 90 percent success, then 880 falls, which Itzik Bar was supposed to report at the end of the operation, is equivalent to 28 percent success.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation from an IDF spokesman, I tried to understand for myself how it happens that the home Front command reports 3 times more falls in a built-up area than an IDF spokesman.
It is clear to all that the IDF is feeding off air defences, and their mutual interest is of course to glorify the performance of Iron Dome. The way to do this goes by the definition of “built-up area” or “populated area.” In terms of air defenses, whose interceptor system computer in most cases knows the exact fall location before the home front command gets there, can immediately check on its digital map whether that point contains immediate proximity, say within a 30-meter radius, structures or other facilities. If the answer is no, that fall falls into the “open spaces” category , even if it's in the middle of the city. All of this is probably done automatically by the computer. The determination of the computer can be manually updated later according to the damage reported by the Home Front Command. For example: If the rocket hit 10 meters from a building then a built-up area, if it entered the ground and exploded in the Yarkon Park it is an open area. If the shrapnel hit a single vehicle that happened to be parked there, then still an open area, but if 5 cars were hit then a built-up area, and so on.
In contrast, the Home Front Command makes the decision based solely on the area of impact. Either the entire area is included in the populated area defined in the maps, or not. So it is clear that the overall number of falls on the ground according to the Home Front Command will be many times greater.
Factually, the current IDF definition of a built-up area in terms of alerts and count of falls is according to the non-secret map with 1,700 warning areas that the Home Front Command has defined for all Israeli populated areas.
Conclusion: The Home Front Command is right on the count, an IDF spokesman playing with definitions and numbers…
The 28 percent success rate is not the end of the line: we have seen that the IDF spokesman does not provide true data on falls in built-up areas, we can continue to calculate for example what happens to the above efficiency percentages if the number of intercept attempts was not 2720 but around 1000 ( the Israeli INSS website that collected and compiled visible data reached a conclusion of 1100 ), 30 percent of the 3400 rockets that reached Israeli territory. It's reasonable and reasonable. For example, during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 with almost the same volume of rocket and mortar fire, the IDF carried out 800 interception tests.
880 tackles against 1,000 interceptions gives 12 percent success rate, not 28.
In summary, unlike Dr. Muti Schaefer who passionately argues that Iron Dome is one big hoax and doesn't shoot down anything, I think it does shoot down here and there, but much less than the 90 percent that is claimed. And then you have to understand that when efficiency drops below a certain threshold, there's no point in the whole system being up and running.
For all those convinced that Iron Dome saved hundreds of Israelis ' lives on the home front, the dry statistics show that it did not. According to the Shin Bet website, in Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, 4,600 rockets and mortars were fired, killing 13 people. In "Guard of Walls" after 12 years, 4,300 people were shot and 12 killed. Exactly the same lethality – one fatality for every 355 rockets. The only difference is that in 2008 there was still no Iron Dome.
An IDF spokesman said the enemy had improved over the years, and the death toll at the “Guard of Walls” demonstrated Iron Dome's high effectiveness. But it is hard to accept the “improvement” claim that a quarter of the rockets failed to leave Gaza or fell at sea, and only a third of those that did reach Israel were aimed at built-up areas. That means only 25 percent of the rockets threatened built-up territory, while built-up areas make up about 15 percent of Israel's total. The enemy therefore appeared to be "not improved" in its rocket fire. A little more deliberate than random statistical gunfire.
https://www.richardsilverstein.com/2021/06/27/%d7%99%d7%a2%d7%99%d7%9c%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%9b%d7%99%d7%a4%d7%aa-%d7%91%d7%a8%d7%96%d7%9c-%d7%91%d7%9e%d7%91%d7%a6%d7%a2-%d7%a9%d7%95%d7%9e%d7%a8-%d7%97%d7%95%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%aa/#comments
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