It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever. (Summa Theologiae, Part II-II, Q.19, A.3, RO3)
Sound familiar? I wonder what Aristotle and Aquinas would think of rulers using their power to unjustly prevent citizens from providing for their families, citing fear of a disease as their "justification."
Actually, I don't have to wonder. Aquinas has this to say about law, first quoting Augustine:
As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (I-II:91:2 ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law. (Summa Theologiae, Part I, Q.95, A.2)
>It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever. (*Summa Theologiae*, Part II-II, Q.19, A.3, RO3)
Sound familiar? I wonder what Aristotle and Aquinas would think of rulers using their power to unjustly prevent citizens from providing for their families, citing fear of a disease as their "justification."
Actually, I don't have to wonder. Aquinas has this to say about law, first quoting Augustine:
>As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (I-II:91:2 ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law. (*Summa Theologiae*, Part I, Q.95, A.2)
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