Good discussion!
If this was a Reagan/Newt revolution with a still strong DS, I am with you. I think the DS has taken a significant hit via clandestine means. We will have our first indicator this fall. It is tough to know how the clandestine war is going, but all my sources are positive. Publicly: how do you wake people up? You piss them off.
I think the DS has taken a significant hit via clandestine means.
This is where we depart. I think most of what we see is inter-factional infighting and little else, at the tail-end of a dying fiscal empire.
It's flailing, and the only adults in the room are probably part of the pentagon. And their priorities amount to maintaining the ponzi, because a couple billion people die if it collapses. In other words their best outcome is the status quo, or more corruption, and slow decline. And I think they are failing but fighting hard to get this outcome.
This comports, again, with what other empires throughout time have done when in decline: circle the wagons and retreat to defensible positions, minimizing the prior costs of defending over-extended territories.
On that prediction I can say our defense of taiwan will be limited, as taiwan is slowly strangled off by more and more military blockades, rather than out-right action. Which wouldn't be an unreasonable conclusion based on the existing premise, supported no less by what has already happened: u.s. refusal to engage in direct action in ukraine, instead again, resorting to proxies. The past is the best predictor of the future.
And I don't blame them. The mid-level political considerations don't have the support because they don't support the nations interests..at the political level.
At the very high level, long-term, defeating russia in ukraine does benefit u.s. national interests. Its this gap between short term and long term that destroys the feasibility of any sort of support. Thats a weakness built into the constitution and decision making structure and how its election cycles interrupt long-term planning.
Which is probably a good thing, because politics, unlike economics, is a different sort of animal, one that only makes bad decisions worse by its own lack of foresight.
Leviathan was probably blind. The u.s. government is too.
Taiwan is still a question for me. We have 4 carrier groups there at the moment. The British and French have carriers there. Japan has "helicopter destroyers" (what they call their carriers) there with US F-35s and US pilots. Australia has ships there as well. An awful lot of firepower. And it has been there for many months.
An awful lot of firepower. And it has been there for many months.
yes, and awful lot. But has it been there before for many months? Thats the question. How unusual is this configuration of nations, and level of power, compared to past military exercises?
What are the paths and scenarios it can go wrong? What are the reasons any actor involved might want it to 'go wrong'? Xi wanting a war to quell riots in china. America needing a war as a political distraction. Taiwain needing america and china to fight, so Taiwain doesn't have to fight Xi.
And more importantly, are the assumptions behind those reasons real? How likely is the truth of the various details supporting the baseline assumptions underlying these scenarios?
Is Xi really facing instability? Is that related to upcoming party elections? Who, if anyone, would be his challengers? They would be the most likely culprits, supposing the instability is real.
Does america want a war for distractions sake? Or because we are owned by Xi or others, and they intend to have us intentionally lose? Is america attempting actually to project strength while avoiding war for fear of losing or angering our economic 'ally' of china?
Questioning assumptions is no doubt important.
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