The capture of the Kuril Islands, is not a loss for Russia, it is in fact an opportunity and a significant mistake by the u.s. Heres why.

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This is the u.s. daring russia to do something. If russia does something, they're fucked. If they do nothing, they're a paper tiger, again fucked.

But the u.s. action in poland rather than ukraine, is the key to translating the motivating factor here:

The u.s. is in poland, not as staging, but as a backstop to the ukrainian conflict. Which tells you we have no intention at all of genuinely entering ukraine.

If this is true, then the taking of the island isn't just to embarrass russia, but to duplicate the ukrainian issue elsewhere, geopolitically. The u.s. is probably thinking that by creating "many fronts potentially leading to ww3", it can reverse the position of the u.s. being perceived as aggressor, to that of russia being perceived as an aggressor.

The correct response, despite this being a no-win situation, is then for russia to do nothing. Yes, its not a good place to be. And yes it may look like, to some of the russian government, they are losing.

Trust that they are not. They are winning. The u.s. economically is more fragile than russia. This is a matter of attrition. And right now the optics, despite all the media hype, are still against the u.s. It's hard to perceive and parse, but this is the exact and correct interpretation of the scenarios currently unfolding.

This is not a war of "who can win", this is a war of "who can survive and hold out the longest."

The u.s. and its cities guarantee it loses, because these cities are huge unproductive burdens, with lots of dissatisfied and easily agitated inhabitants.

Better yet, typically you would not reward bad behavior, but the russians, like most serious people, understand that in politics sometimes one of the best moves IS to do just that, reward bad behavior.

Japan taking an island that is close to it anyway, is actually an opportunity to ease the pain and grapple some victory out of a no-win situation. And if it is not a win, it is at least almost a win. Which is still better than the alternative.

The u.s. wants to turn all the countries currently supporting russia, against her, by using multiple provocation-fronts to cast russia as the true aggressor. If it can do this, then the u.s. will succeed in isolating russia.

If russia were instead to gift or agree to lease this island to Japan, the effect will be enormous:

First russia treats it as huge crisis which baits the u.s. into thinking russia took the bait
Then russia demands to meet with japan, but is clear "war is off the table", feinting strategic weakness. This is not typical of russia in short term strategy, and will confuse the u.s.
Russia offers to bring japan into the fold of trading partners, and offers oil as trade. This pulls DOUBLE duty by pitting japans demand for oil against u.s. control. The japanese can then use this new position as leverage to demand concessions from the u.s., which will alienate the u.s. and in its manic unhinged state cause them to either threaten japan, punish japan, give in making the u.s. look weak, or give up, or some combination of those.
On the off chance japan agrees, even a little bit, even partially, the u.s. economic blockade of russia will be dead on arrival everywhere. EVERY SINGLE TRADING PARTNER will realize all at once, that to get out from under americas thumb, all they have to do is look to russia. The anticipation of step four, all but guarantees the u.s. fucks up in step three. A sort of self-fulfilling prophecy

This is what I meant when in my black swans post I wrote "Better still (or worse depending on how you see it), from this vantage, the awareness of options, and their interaction with macro variables, are a self-reinforcing loop, interacting to assure x leads to y, and y leads to x."

If you engineer scenarios where there are only a limited set of solutions, and all solutions point to a general outcome you want, you effectively control your opponents decision making and policy. Steps three and four allow russia to do this to the u.s. In chess the equivalent is something between a fork, a pin, and a skewer, all at once.

I see of no reason why russia wouldn't want to seize the opportunity to meet with Japan.

This is the u.s. *daring* russia to do something. If russia does something, they're fucked. If they do nothing, they're a paper tiger, again fucked. But the u.s. action in poland rather than ukraine, is the *key* to translating the motivating factor here: The u.s. is in poland, not as staging, but as a backstop *to* the ukrainian conflict. Which tells you we have *no intention at all* of genuinely entering ukraine. If this is true, then the taking of the island isn't just to embarrass russia, but to *duplicate* the ukrainian issue elsewhere, *geopolitically*. The u.s. is probably thinking that by creating "many fronts *potentially* leading to ww3", it can reverse the position of the *u.s.* being perceived as aggressor, to that of *russia* being perceived as an aggressor. The correct response, despite this being a no-win situation, is then for russia to *do nothing*. Yes, its not a good place to be. And yes it may look like, to some of the russian government, they are losing. Trust that they are not. They are winning. The u.s. economically is more fragile than russia. This is a matter of *attrition*. And right now the optics, despite *all the media* hype, are still against the u.s. It's hard to perceive and parse, but this is the exact and correct interpretation of the scenarios currently unfolding. This is not a war of "who can win", this is a war of "who can survive and hold out the longest." The u.s. and its cities guarantee it loses, because these cities are huge unproductive burdens, with lots of dissatisfied and easily agitated inhabitants. Better yet, typically you would not *reward* bad behavior, but the russians, like most serious people, understand that in *politics* sometimes one of the *best* moves IS to do just that, reward bad behavior. Japan taking an island that is close to it anyway, is actually an opportunity to ease the pain and grapple some victory out of a no-win situation. And if it is not a *win*, it is at least *almost* a win. Which is still better than the alternative. The u.s. wants to turn all the countries currently supporting russia, against her, by using multiple provocation-fronts to cast russia as the true aggressor. If it can do this, then the u.s. will succeed in isolating russia. If russia were instead to *gift* or agree to *lease* this island to Japan, the effect will be enormous: 1. First russia treats it as *huge crisis* which baits the u.s. into thinking russia took the bait 2. Then russia demands to meet with japan, but is clear "war is off the table", feinting strategic weakness. This is not typical of russia in short term strategy, and will confuse the u.s. 3. Russia offers to bring japan into the fold of trading partners, and offers oil as trade. This pulls DOUBLE duty by pitting japans demand for oil against u.s. control. The japanese can then use this new position as leverage to demand concessions from the u.s., which will alienate the u.s. and in its manic unhinged state cause them to either *threaten* japan, *punish japan*, *give in* making the u.s. look weak, or *give up*, or some combination of those. 4. On the off chance japan agrees, **even a little bit**, even **partially**, the u.s. economic blockade of russia will be *dead on arrival* everywhere. EVERY SINGLE TRADING PARTNER will realize all at once, that to get out from under americas thumb, all they have to do is look to russia. The *anticipation* of step four, *all but guarantees* the u.s. fucks up in step three. A sort of self-fulfilling prophecy This is what I meant when in my black swans post I wrote "Better still (or worse depending on how you see it), from this vantage, the awareness of options, and their interaction with macro variables, are a self-reinforcing loop, interacting to assure x leads to y, and y leads to x." If you engineer scenarios where there are only a limited set of solutions, and all solutions point to a *general* outcome you want, you effectively control your opponents decision making and policy. Steps three and four allow russia to do this to the u.s. In chess the equivalent is something between a fork, a pin, *and* a skewer, all at once. I see of no reason why russia wouldn't *want* to seize the opportunity to meet with Japan.

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