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Were his leaks staged? Are the clowns afraid of the nsa?
Were his leaks staged? Are the clowns afraid of the nsa?
https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2022/eu-kommission-will-alle-chatnachrichten-durchleuchten
English translation:
EU Commission wants to screen all chat messages 2022-05-09 12:30:21, linus On Wednesday, May 11, 2022, the EU Commission is expected to publish the draft law on so-called chat control. An AI-based check of all message content and images directly on our devices is planned. The so-called client-side scanning would be an attack on any confidential communication.
The draft provides for all communication content to be examined directly on our devices and, in the event of suspicion, to be diverted. This client-side scanning would not be the first over-the-top and misguided surveillance method to be justified in the fight against child abuse.
Undoubtedly, victims of child abuse need better help, but chat control is an over-the-top approach, easy to circumvent, and completely wrong. Without any expected success in terms of the actual goal, an unprecedented monitoring tool is to be introduced.
Completely missed the target The proposed law would require each device to scan every message for images of child abuse and criminals contacting children. If such content is recognized in a message, it should be forwarded directly to a control authority or the police.
Not only does mass scanning attack confidential communications at their very foundations, it would also be ineffective: Criminals are already using distribution channels that would not be affected by these scans and will easily evade scans in the future as well:
The perpetrators use public hosters instead of the messengers targeted by the commission - not least because messengers are completely unsuitable for exchanging large collections of files. They also encrypt the data before the exchange.
For this reason alone, the planned monitoring will not prevent the further dissemination of abuse images.
No trusted communication without trusted devices Not only journalists and whistleblowers depend on trustworthy communication - it is a fundamental right and an important cornerstone of our IT security. For communication to be truly trustworthy , two conditions must be met:
Your own device must have integrity and may not forward content to third parties Encryption must be secure, so we don't have to trust the network With telecommunications secrecy and the fundamental right to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems , chat control overrides two fundamental fundamental rights. Users lose control over what data they share and with whom. They lose basic trust in their own devices.
So far it is not clear who should define and control the detection algorithms and databases. Such a non-transparent system can and will be easily expanded after its introduction. It is already foreseeable today that the rights exploitation industry will be just as interested in the system as anti-democratic governments. It is all the more frightening with what innocence it is now to be introduced.
Error rates lead to a flood of images at control points An "artificial intelligence" that checks for abusive content will also incorrectly mark content as illegal . Even the smallest error rates would lead to massive amounts of incorrectly "recognized" and rejected messages: In Germany alone, well over half a billion messages are sent every day Even enormously "good" recognition rates would lead to the ejection of several thousand messages per day.
Of course, the probability of diversion increases in the case of private, completely legal and consensual image exchange among adults and young people. Young adults can already look forward to the assessment of their age by the inspection bodies. The numb worry about whether our messages will be leaked, who is viewing them, and how safe they are from abuse there will affect us all.
At the same time, mountains of irrelevant material will accumulate at the checkpoints and prevent the officers from carrying out important investigative work. Investigating authorities are already overburdened with the data that is accumulating today . Investigations are not successful and materials found are not even deleted . Effectively eliminating these deficits would be the most important goal in the fight against child abuse. Instead, the Commission wants to rely on mass surveillance and the promise of salvation from "artificial intelligence".
Chat control is fundamentally to be rejected as a fundamentally misguided technology.
https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2022/eu-kommission-will-alle-chatnachrichten-durchleuchten
English translation:
EU Commission wants to screen all chat messages
2022-05-09 12:30:21, linus
On Wednesday, May 11, 2022, the EU Commission is expected to publish the draft law on so-called chat control. An AI-based check of all message content and images directly on our devices is planned. The so-called client-side scanning would be an attack on any confidential communication.
The draft provides for all communication content to be examined directly on our devices and, in the event of suspicion, to be diverted. This client-side scanning would not be the first over-the-top and misguided surveillance method to be justified in the fight against child abuse.
Undoubtedly, victims of child abuse need better help, but chat control is an over-the-top approach, easy to circumvent, and completely wrong. Without any expected success in terms of the actual goal, an unprecedented monitoring tool is to be introduced.
Completely missed the target
The proposed law would require each device to scan every message for images of child abuse and criminals contacting children. If such content is recognized in a message, it should be forwarded directly to a control authority or the police.
Not only does mass scanning attack confidential communications at their very foundations, it would also be ineffective: Criminals are already using distribution channels that would not be affected by these scans and will easily evade scans in the future as well:
The perpetrators use public hosters instead of the messengers targeted by the commission - not least because messengers are completely unsuitable for exchanging large collections of files. They also encrypt the data before the exchange.
For this reason alone, the planned monitoring will not prevent the further dissemination of abuse images.
No trusted communication without trusted devices
Not only journalists and whistleblowers depend on trustworthy communication - it is a fundamental right and an important cornerstone of our IT security. For communication to be truly trustworthy , two conditions must be met:
Your own device must have integrity and may not forward content to third parties
Encryption must be secure, so we don't have to trust the network
With telecommunications secrecy and the fundamental right to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems , chat control overrides two fundamental fundamental rights. Users lose control over what data they share and with whom. They lose basic trust in their own devices.
So far it is not clear who should define and control the detection algorithms and databases. Such a non-transparent system can and will be easily expanded after its introduction. It is already foreseeable today that the rights exploitation industry will be just as interested in the system as anti-democratic governments. It is all the more frightening with what innocence it is now to be introduced.
Error rates lead to a flood of images at control points
An "artificial intelligence" that checks for abusive content will also incorrectly mark content as illegal . Even the smallest error rates would lead to massive amounts of incorrectly "recognized" and rejected messages: In Germany alone, well over half a billion messages are sent every day Even enormously "good" recognition rates would lead to the ejection of several thousand messages per day.
Of course, the probability of diversion increases in the case of private, completely legal and consensual image exchange among adults and young people. Young adults can already look forward to the assessment of their age by the inspection bodies. The numb worry about whether our messages will be leaked, who is viewing them, and how safe they are from abuse there will affect us all.
At the same time, mountains of irrelevant material will accumulate at the checkpoints and prevent the officers from carrying out important investigative work. Investigating authorities are already overburdened with the data that is accumulating today . Investigations are not successful and materials found are not even deleted . Effectively eliminating these deficits would be the most important goal in the fight against child abuse. Instead, the Commission wants to rely on mass surveillance and the promise of salvation from "artificial intelligence".
Chat control is fundamentally to be rejected as a fundamentally misguided technology.
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