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The axioms of set theory imply a primitive ontology in which existence is predicated on containing other things or being oneself contained. Moreover, such a description is exhaustive: when describing anything as a set, we have a complete ontology for the thing.

Second, the basic relation of all things in reality is according to their membership, to this or that set. This implies that there is nothing which exists that is not either a set or an element within a set, or both.

There is exactly one set with no members, called the empty set or ∅.

∅ ⊂ A for every A (including ∅) but it is not true that ∅ ∈ A for every A.

In English, the empty set (having zero elements) is a subset of all sets, but it isn't true that ∅ is an element of all sets. We'll see why below.

So, if we take A = {1, 2, 3} and we begin to remove elements, we can show that ∅ is a subset of A. (Sn are subsets of A).

Sx ⊆ A = {1, 2, 3}

Sy ⊂ A = {1, 2} (one element removed)

Sz ⊂ A = {1} (two elements removed)

∅ ⊂ A = {...} (all elements removed)

Note, that this does NOT mean A = {∅}. ∅ is not an element of A, but since ∅ has no elements, it is thought to 'participate' as a subset of all sets. We might say that the membership of ∅ (that is, no members) is implied by all sets. All sets are collections whose cardinality could be be zero, therefore ∅ is a subset of all of them. ___

But what is nothing? The empty set is the one having no elements. How does this relate to the number 0? Zero is not nothing. Zero denotes cardinality. Zero would be the cardinality of the empty set, as in the number of elements it has. The empty set has some correspondence to zero in Boolean logic for computer science, but I'm not terribly interested to get into a discussion about zero: just let it rest that mathematically, zero is not nothing.

What I'm interested in is the metaphysics implied by the empty set. Most mathematicians probably have the equivalent to the empty set of reasons for finding this discussion useful (dork joke).

Someone could say that the entire inquiry is trivial: Nothing can be said about nothing. It's tautological. To speak with regard to it is just to say something, akin to {...}. By denoting the empty set this way, haven't I already missed my target? I've said something about that which has no somethings.

This is what I find metaphysically interesting (of course, I'm making all kinds of assumptions as to the limits of human reasoning and intellect). To anyone besides a metaphysician, any further discussion beyond our ability to represent the situation symbolically will seem childish.

___

It seems that there is no proper way to speak of nothing simpliciter.

In fact, whatever thought is, seems to preclude us from access to nothing by its very existence. Basic intentionality (with its aboutness) necessarily creates information, and nothingness cannot communicate information.

What ∅ signifies to me is that in probing what nothing is, the mind can only go so far as a state of affairs in which there is nothing. When we say there is nothing in the fridge, the logical extension in the statement at least picks out the refrigerator having the state of affairs in which there is no food item inside - here, even 'nothing' has an extension: food. You could say that 'nothing in the fridge' is describing the empty food set. So we don't truly mean nothing...instead we mean 0 in the presence of something: the place of food. If the fridge were a set of all its elements, F, the situation of 'nothing in the fridge' is F = {...}. This is NOT nothing.

A great deal of metaphysical debate concerning the origin of the universe involves reference to nothing, as in the possibility of the nothingness that preceded the existence of the universe. But what is it that we refer to when we speak about this possibility?

Such statements always strike me as describing any primordial pre-existence as ∅. We think of nothing and cannot do so without the brackets {...}, as in, there at least existed the state of affairs in which something could exist. We imagine vast blackness, and still, it is necessarily a thing which could contain elements. So questions about origins of the universe pivot on whether you think true nothingness is a coherent term.

  1. If nothing* is possible, then a posteriori we find ourselves in a current state of reality which must have experienced creatio ex nihilo. If there was truly nothing, this change is describable as at least the change from no state of affairs to a state of affairs, ∅, where the possibility for the inclusion of elements existed. We think creatio ex nihilo is logically impossible, so this is ruled out. If there is something today, there was never nothing.

  2. If nothing* is not possible, and something has always existed, then we must still explain ∅ according to what we know about contingent existence. To do this we'll return below to the idea of looking at sequential subsets.

Contingent existence is that which does not contain its own reason for existing, that is, it must be explained according to causes from without. An apple is contingent. You are contingent.

If the universe, U, is the finite set {1, 2, 3.....n}, it is possible by principles of causation to scientifically reduce the universe by sequential subsets as we did above, where the first subset has (n-1) elements of U. For the sake of example:

U = {f(E)1.....f(E)n} | f(E)i = { x ∈ E: u({x}) --> u({y}) for all y ∈ E }

So, the universe consists of elements which are functional states where any state can be explained by some basic function, u, which transforms some subset x to y. Granted, that's rough. But physics is pursuing an elegant theory of everything which by way of a finite set of equations hopes to do exactly this for every element of the universe - one theory which could causally reduce all of the information about the entire state of the universe.

Still, the initial state of the universe had no physical elements, and so without x and y, we're left with:

Scientific pre-universe: U = {∅, f(E)}, implying that we must at least consider the empty set an event space.

Can the universe be logically reduced to the empty set, i.e. to a state of affairs where the potential to exist is all that exists? Again this depends upon the true possibility of nothing. If nothingness could never have been the case (which we think it cannot because creatio ex nihilo is ruled out), then the reduction to the empty set is only possible where some agent brought about the first elements in the empty set.

Instead of this, particle physics might have you thinking that reality is an infinite regress of subsets of primitive particles. Others would like to appeal to the emergence of matter from natural laws, but since the LAWS of nature themselves are not actually elements, but are relations among elements, the only possible appeal would be to existence as a collection of something.

Put another way, the laws of nature could not exist prior to the set of elements whose members can relate. The universe could not have come to exist by the actions of laws relating the behaviors of matter.

Effectively, scientific reduction itself is the description of relations applying over subsets of U, to reduce them to smaller and smaller subsets, where (n-1) is thought to have greater explanatory power than (n). If the universe is a set of states, we can reduce these states to previous states, so on and so forth. We find, however, this always arrives at some subset which can neither be reduced or explained. Yet, whatever these least reducible things might be, they are contingent by definition.

According to physics, their explanation must be in laws of nature. By this mistake, the only analytical a posteriori necessity for the origin of this universe was the set { ∅, f(E) }, where we have the state of affairs for things to potentially exist, and the lawful relations which would govern events if there were any elements to be relating. But herein lies the contradiction. No relation is an element of a set, nor can a relation exist in ∅.

To get around this, physics requires an appeal to a different sort of infinite regress of elements: the Multiverse (MV).

MV = {Ux, {Uy, Uz.... ∞}}

...which says that our universe, Ux, is one element of a multiverse of infinite elements. This is how the regress to the untenable situation of U = ∅ is avoided, by introducing not an infinite regress of actual universes in causal succession, but a plenum of weighted probabilities, something more like:

MV = {P(Ux), {P(Uy), P(Uz).... ∞}}.

We just happen to find ourselves in the convenient scenario where the probability of our universe existing with just the necessary relations was = 1. Lucky us. Apparently, such an appeal to the infinitude of existence (as many possible universes), we escape both creatio ex nihilo and also the primordial state of the universe being simply ∅.

To this we ask: isn't it logically possible that the probabilities for all universes in MV are 0? Of course not, there is always a necessary element or we'd arrive at ∅. So ∅ remains a possibility for MU, contra there being a necessary universe in MV. If there is a NECESSARY universe in MV, then we have arrived at another problem, which has to do with defining the term necessary.

Someone could say, "Sure, maybe there is a necessary universe in MV and so all but (∞ - 1) universes is contingent."

Such a necessary universe could not have contingent elements. But if universes are defined as being exhaustively described by the contingent elements they contain, then the Multiverse itself could not contain any necessary elements.

What is necessary must exist separately from MV, i.e. the necessary being cannot be an element within MV. This precludes the objection where someone simply redefines what a universe is: "If there is a necessary being that exists, then MV would just come to include that thing." But if inclusion in MV means being a universal set which is itself exhausted by membership of only finite and contingent elements, nothing necessary can be included in the set MV.

As a solution to these problems, I ask: what is not an element in ANY set, but is NECESSARILY a subset proper of EVERY set?

It is ∅.

It is just the state of affairs in which the potential to exist is. One cannot avoid the intuition that the same equivalence of the foundation of the universe, ∅, has parallels with the human mind.

After all, the mind can produce no thought which refers to nothing. ∅ is the most primitive concept we can form. This would make sense if ∅ underlies a universe which is fundamentally self-simulating. Indeed, if we take mental causation seriously, then we must face the fact that we arrive at a problem similar to the Cosmological Problem itself when we consider some thoughts. Therefore, the causal explanation for certain thoughts might be thought to refer back to an analogous form of necessary being, namely ∅, or a basic plenum of creative potential, combined with the event of actualization granting Form.

We might very well think that mind cannot be explained exhaustively by the brain (though its mental powers can be locally explained, i.e. if my brain dies, my mind appears to cease to exist). But if instead we think that brains are not producing, but rather accessing the ∅, then we have a concept that looks a great deal like the Logos, an active principle which produces order from chaos.

___

The axioms of set theory imply a primitive ontology in which existence is predicated on containing other things or being oneself contained. Moreover, such a *description is exhaustive*: when describing anything as a set, we have a complete ontology for the thing. Second, the basic *relation* of all things in reality is according to their membership, to this or that set. This implies that there is nothing which exists that is not either a set or an element within a set, or both. There is exactly one set with no members, called the **empty set** or ∅. >∅ ⊂ A for every A (including ∅) but it is not true that ∅ ∈ A for every A. In English, the empty set (having zero elements) is a subset of *all* sets, but it isn't true that ∅ is an *element* of all sets. We'll see why below. So, if we take A = {1, 2, 3} and we begin to remove elements, we can show that ∅ is a subset of A. (Sn are subsets of A). >Sx ⊆ A = {1, 2, 3} >Sy ⊂ A = {1, 2} (one element removed) >Sz ⊂ A = {1} (two elements removed) >∅ ⊂ A = {...} (all elements removed) Note, that this does NOT mean A = {∅}. ∅ is not an element of A, but since ∅ has no elements, it is thought to 'participate' as a subset of all sets. We might say that the membership of ∅ (that is, no members) is *implied* by all sets. All sets are collections whose cardinality *could be* be zero, therefore ∅ is a subset of all of them. ___ But what is nothing? The empty set is the one having no elements. How does this relate to the number 0? Zero is not nothing. Zero denotes *cardinality*. Zero would be the cardinality of the empty set, as in the number of elements it has. The empty set has some correspondence to zero in Boolean logic for computer science, but I'm not terribly interested to get into a discussion about zero: just let it rest that mathematically, zero is not nothing. What I'm interested in is the metaphysics implied by the empty set. Most mathematicians probably have the equivalent to the empty set of reasons for finding this discussion useful (dork joke). Someone could say that the entire inquiry is trivial: Nothing can be said about nothing. It's tautological. To speak with regard to it is just to say *something*, akin to {...}. By denoting the empty set this way, haven't I already missed my target? I've said something about that which has no somethings. This is what I find metaphysically interesting (of course, I'm making all kinds of assumptions as to the limits of human reasoning and intellect). To anyone besides a metaphysician, any further discussion beyond our ability to represent the situation symbolically will seem childish. ___ It seems that there is no proper way to speak of nothing simpliciter. In fact, *whatever thought is*, seems to preclude us from access to nothing by its very existence. Basic intentionality (with its *aboutness*) necessarily creates information, and nothingness cannot communicate information. What ∅ signifies to me is that in probing what nothing is, the mind can only go so far as a **state of affairs** in which there is nothing. When we say there is nothing in the fridge, the logical extension in the statement at least picks out the refrigerator having the state of affairs in which there is no food item inside - here, even 'nothing' has an extension: food. You could say that 'nothing in the fridge' is describing the empty food set. So we don't truly mean *nothing*...instead we mean 0 in the *presence* of something: *the place of food*. If the fridge were a set of all its elements, F, the situation of 'nothing in the fridge' is F = {...}. This is NOT nothing. A great deal of metaphysical debate concerning the origin of the universe involves reference to nothing, as in the possibility of the nothingness that preceded the existence of the universe. But what is it that we refer to when we speak about this possibility? Such statements always strike me as describing any primordial pre-existence as ∅. We think of nothing and cannot do so without the brackets {...}, as in, there at least existed the *state of affairs* in which something could exist. We imagine vast blackness, and still, it is necessarily a thing which *could contain* elements. So questions about origins of the universe pivot on whether you think true nothingness is a coherent term. 1. If nothing* is possible, then *a posteriori* we find ourselves in a current state of reality which must have experienced creatio ex nihilo. If there was truly nothing, this change is describable as at least the change from no state of affairs *to* a *state of affairs*, ∅, where the possibility for the inclusion of elements existed. We think *creatio ex nihilo* is logically impossible, so this is ruled out. If there is something today, there was *never* nothing. 2. If nothing* is not possible, and something has always existed, then we must still explain ∅ according to what we know about *contingent existence*. To do this we'll return below to the idea of looking at sequential subsets. >Contingent existence is that which does not contain its own reason for existing, that is, it must be explained according to causes from without. An apple is contingent. You are contingent. If the universe, U, is the *finite* set {1, 2, 3.....n}, it is possible by principles of causation to scientifically reduce the universe by sequential subsets as we did above, where the first subset has (n-1) elements of U. For the sake of example: > U = {f(E)1.....f(E)n} | f(E)i = { x ∈ E: u({x}) --> u({y}) for all y ∈ E } So, the universe consists of elements which are functional states where any state can be explained by some basic function, u, which transforms some subset x to y. Granted, that's rough. But physics is pursuing an elegant theory of everything which by way of a finite set of equations hopes to do exactly this for every element of the universe - one theory which could causally reduce all of the information about the entire state of the universe. Still, the initial state of the universe had no physical elements, and so without x and y, we're left with: > Scientific pre-universe: U = {∅, f(E)}, implying that we must at least consider the empty set an event space. Can the universe be logically reduced to the empty set, i.e. to a state of affairs where the potential to exist is all that exists? Again this depends upon the true possibility of nothing. If *nothingness could never have been the case* (which we think it cannot because creatio ex nihilo is ruled out), then the reduction to the empty set is **only possible where some agent brought about the first elements in the empty set**. Instead of this, particle physics might have you thinking that reality is an infinite regress of subsets of primitive particles. Others would like to appeal to the emergence of matter from natural laws, but since the *LAWS of nature* themselves are not actually elements, but are *relations* among elements, the only possible appeal would be to existence as a *collection* of something. Put another way, the laws of nature could not exist prior to the set of elements whose members can relate. The universe could not have come to exist by the actions of laws relating the behaviors of matter. Effectively, scientific reduction itself is the description of relations applying over subsets of U, to reduce them to smaller and smaller subsets, where (n-1) is thought to have greater explanatory power than (n). If the universe is a set of states, we can reduce these states to previous states, so on and so forth. We find, however, this always arrives at some subset which can neither be reduced or explained. Yet, whatever these least reducible things might be, they are contingent by definition. According to physics, their explanation *must* be in laws of nature. By this mistake, the only analytical *a posteriori* necessity for the origin of this universe was the set { ∅, f(E) }, where we have the state of affairs for things to potentially exist, and the lawful relations which would govern events *if there were any elements to be relating*. But herein lies the contradiction. No relation is an element of a set, nor can a relation exist in ∅. To get around this, physics requires an appeal to a different sort of infinite regress of elements: the **Multiverse** (MV). > MV = {Ux, {Uy, Uz.... ∞}} ...which says that our universe, Ux, is one element of a *multiverse* of infinite elements. This is how the regress to the untenable situation of U = ∅ is avoided, by introducing not an infinite regress of *actual* universes in causal succession, but a plenum of weighted probabilities, something more like: > MV = {P(Ux), {P(Uy), P(Uz).... ∞}}. We just happen to find ourselves in the convenient scenario where the probability of our universe existing with just the necessary relations was = 1. Lucky us. Apparently, such an appeal to the infinitude of existence (as many possible universes), we escape both *creatio ex nihilo* and also the primordial state of the universe being simply ∅. To this we ask: isn't it logically possible that the probabilities for all universes in MV are 0? Of course not, there is always a necessary element or we'd arrive at ∅. So ∅ remains a possibility for MU, contra there being a necessary universe in MV. *If there is a NECESSARY universe* in MV, then we have arrived at another problem, which has to do with defining the term necessary. Someone could say, "Sure, maybe there is a necessary universe in MV and so all but (∞ - 1) universes is contingent." Such a necessary universe could not have contingent elements. But if universes are defined as being exhaustively described by the contingent elements they contain, then the Multiverse itself could not contain any necessary elements. What is necessary must exist separately from MV, i.e. the necessary being cannot be an element within MV. This precludes the objection where someone simply redefines what a universe is: "If there is a necessary being that exists, then MV would just come to include that thing." But if inclusion in MV means being a universal set which is itself exhausted by membership of only finite and contingent elements, nothing necessary can be included in the set MV. As a solution to these problems, I ask: **what is not an element in ANY set, but is NECESSARILY a *subset* proper of EVERY set?** It is **∅**. It is just the state of affairs in which the potential to exist *is*. One cannot avoid the intuition that the same equivalence of the foundation of the universe, ∅, has parallels with the human mind. After all, the mind can produce no thought which refers to nothing. ∅ is the most primitive concept we can form. This would make sense if ∅ underlies a universe which is fundamentally self-simulating. Indeed, if we take mental causation seriously, then we must face the fact that we arrive at a problem similar to the Cosmological Problem itself when we consider *some* thoughts. Therefore, the causal explanation for certain thoughts might be thought to refer back to an analogous form of necessary being, namely ∅, or a basic plenum of creative potential, combined with the event of actualization granting Form. We might very well think that mind cannot be explained exhaustively by the brain (though its mental powers can be *locally* explained, i.e. if my brain dies, my mind appears to cease to exist). But if instead we think that brains are not producing, but rather *accessing* the ∅, then we have a concept that looks a great deal like the Logos, an active principle which produces order from chaos. ___

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[–] • 0 pt (edited )

but must be selected and organized through the mechanisms of perception.

Hence 'interpretation' as you wrote.

A thought, then, must be something on which I could potentially reflect

Which is to say it is 'available for inspection' yes? Wouldn't that make consciousness and thought separate.

Actually thats an important distinction. You are not your thoughts. Mind is distinct from the contents of the mind.

I agree that someone could perceive the color red and not have any willful thoughts about it, if only because that is the everyday experience (assuming we're not all zombies, ha!) I think where some get into trouble is the perception from their own experience that thought is effortless and thus automatic, because they have been doing it their whole life. And this isn't a direct argument, but I think a case could be made that thoughts are distinct from their subject. So yes, if I'm reading you correct, it would at least appear that thought is an interpretable process, which takes the object as input and produces some other as output.

Reflection would be 'availability' to secondary interpretation, 'attention' would be the process and criteria that selects the particular object of inquiry or contents to be reflected on, thought would be the process that interprets or performs the actual reflection, and perception would be the underlying process and heuristics that sort, organize, categorize, and filter information before making it available or possibly, a substrate interpretation system sans reflection, a sort of preprocessing.

We might then reduce something like freewill to 'free wont', the selection of behavior by the suppression of bad options (thats another thorny issue), because if you look at humans (the only animal we think may have free will, if at all), and human behavior, it amounts to a local optimizer largely for avoiding pain or other bad outcomes, hence 'free wont'.

In fact I'd go so far as to posit that "free will" is some perception and interpretable thought process acting on the process of interpretation itself, made available for reflection.

Definitely adds at least a high level working explanation for effects like hypnosis.

A house is not a home until it is sensed that it is.

So partly structure and meaning are attributed rather than inherent, is what you are saying?

It would explain a lot actually: We could again look at the PMC generating potential plans for picking up a candle or a glass of water. And each of these motor plans would potentially have 'attributions', imputing both the objects relation to say it's handle, and the surface it sits on, and what it means "used for drinking", "creates light", etc, refering back to the notion that how we define and measure is in relation to other things.

In this way we could look at the entire process, from sense data to precept, to thought, as a process that reduces entropy. Meaning and relation are therefore ascribed, as a sort of reasoning, as a process inherent to the entirety of a mind, from the neuron to the full cortical column, in order to find some utility or other in relation to the world. A person touches a candle flame mistakenly, they get burned. A hundred million years of evolution have created the primitive neural signal of 'pain->negative' feedback, and that is then ascribed to the object too. And by this fumbling, both physical, and metaphysical as in the PMC and the countless discarded motor plans (I really like the premotor cortex, forgive its overuse) we arrive at a crude approximation, in the human body, and human mind, the first prototype of empiricism and rationality. What Thomas Aquinas said rings true "Reason in man is like God in the world."

The source of it is prerational, but clearly explainable to some degree.

I think there is distinctions and analogies to be drawn between the irrational<->rational, religious<->empirical, and information<->processes.

For example, a process may be described by information, but the information describing the process is not itself the process. And just as whether a program will halt or not is undecidable, determining, from within a process, whether that process is running, or is purely descriptive, is probably also undecidable. To illustrate, lets suppose we have an infinite tape, holding a simulation of a universe, where a full mind resides. Were it possible to determine whether a process or program is running at time T (real world), or simply stored as information on a tape, then hypothetically the program, with no access to outside information, could determine, even when it is not running, whether or not it had 'lost time'. This is obviously absurd on its face, if we discount any connection to the 'outside world' as it were. Therefore, we can conclude there is at least some definitive distinction between information and process.

We could go so far as to say, though this might be a stretch, that information supervenes process. Otherwise there would be programs or processes that could not be described at all, no matter the representation, information, or means. It would be to say there are processes that can't be described at all, whos output has a non-trivial effect, but no explanatory power beyond the output, total blackboxes, inscrutable in design. Thats a little bit of a rabbit hole to be sure. Could we conceive of such a blackbox that is algorithmic, or describable by information or process but where the internal state could be derived from the output? No of course not, because it is a blackbox. Failing that test, being able to derive process or state, it would not be a blackbox. Of course we could say "this thing is more or less of a blackbox" by some measure, and the measure would be derived from the blackbox output itself, along a spectrum where total correlation of output allows us to derive the full state and process of a blackbox, all the way to output is fully disconnected from internal state or processes. But of course, how then would the process produce the output?

And so we can see if there is an output, an effect, there must be a process that produces it, and is describable by some information mapping to said output. And therefore meaning is ascribed, ad-hoc, in a manner that attempts to reproduce the process and internal state of said process, depending on how effectively it models the thing in question, based on what? The output of the original process of course.

What I think I'm getting at is that even the first cause of something, the irreducible must at least be describable.

Contra-indicative of this thinking, could we describe a process or output, without modelling it? Without modelling its internal state or the steps that produced it and its output?

Were it so, we would again be dealing with a blackbox, in which its processes and internal state are completely uncorrelated to its output. But because that cannot be, as I've already perhaps shown, there can never exist an information theoretic perfect blackbox in real life. And as an aside, just for example, had hawking thought this through, he would have never suggested that information is destroyed or locked up forever in blackholes.

This also suggests to me that the universe itself is not a blackbox. A universe with no end, where time marches on forever, is indistinguishable from a process described by some information on a tape, where from our perspective inside of it, we have no means to tell when the tape or program is stopped, or running. Externally, assuming there is such a thing, the world could be stopped for billions of years in-between every second, and we'd have no way of knowing, but this very fact could be observed from the outside.

What I'm suggesting is there are not just blackboxes that are opaque from the outside looking in, but also blackboxes opaque from the inside looking out. And how would this appear if this is true of our universe?

It would appear as a universe with no beginning, and probably no end, no definitive first cause. Because just as there would be no way to measure wall clock time in an 'external' world or universe that contains your universe, there would therefore be no definitive means to determine when it stopped for good, were it not the case, then we could use the 'signal' as it were, from a measurable beginning, to determine, what the wall clock time is outside the universe, how much time had past--which is of course different from determining when it will stop, or if it already has at least once or more, but thats another tangle to get into for another time.

Of course theres the potential for a 'blackbox that contains itself' but I have no clue what that would look like. Probably a hyperconnected surface where position along a linear space is equivalent to position on a higher dimension or along a different axis, as is the case with say, a mobius strip. And that may be the case e.x. in space, with some scientists positing, the 'boundaries' of our universe are literally like a soapbubble, where if you could travel far enough, you'd reach another universe, supposing you could pass the boundary, but obviously thats beyond even high speculation at this time.

I think what I mean to say is "we agree on a lot" and I just wanted to expound on it all. Thank you for this @Chiro.

I wound up becoming convinced that it's true. If I get time I can try to dig up a conversation we had at Poal back in January sometime.

Yes please do! And thank you for the paper, I'm reading it now.

To me, it's that we are on a stream, a flowing river, that man cannot recreate. It's been flowing. It was already flowing when we became conscious enough to realize we were being pulled along by the current. Life begets life. You don't start a new stream in the one which you are already riding: it's all one stream. Even so-called conscious machines are just going to be elaborations of man, not a new stream, but extensions of the existing one - they carry within them something derived from us, a Logos.

God begat Logos, or perhaps is Logos. Logos begat the universe. The universe begat man. Man begat machine. Fitting and very Gnostic and Herbetesque.

I wonder, supposing God exists, if he looks at man as a mistake, as we may one day look at thinking machines?

Arrows from freud and jungian persuasion.

There is a lot of academic interest in suppressing Jung in favor of Freud. Almost wrote 'fraud', lol. I still wonder what so terrifies 'them' about Jung?

[–] • 1 pt (edited )

What Thomas Aquinas said rings true "Reason in man is like God in the world."

This guy quotes Aquinas. I like him.

God begat Logos, or perhaps is Logos.

Both: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God." (John 1:1)

"For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting." (John 3:16)

Logos (the Son) is both begotten by God, and is God.

Logos begat the universe.

Yup: "All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made." (John 1:3)

I wonder, supposing God exists, if he looks at man as a mistake

Nope: "And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good." (Genesis 1:31)

Any mistake is on man, not God. But that's fine, because our mistake cannot exceed God's ability to correct it. Christ is the ultimate and perfect correction, the very same Logos by which the universe was made.

There is a lot of academic interest in suppressing Jung in favor of Freud. Almost wrote 'fraud', lol. I still wonder what so terrifies 'them' about Jung?

They both have their flaws, but Jung has fewer flaws. Even though he attempted a naturalization of Christianity, he still neglected to be hostile to it, which is anathema in academia. Freud was hostile, which is why he is more promoted, even though his degree of pseudoscience was more pronounced.

@Chiro

[–] • 0 pt

They both have their flaws, but Jung has fewer flaws. Even though he attempted a naturalization of Christianity, he still neglected to be hostile to it, which is anathema in academia. Freud was hostile, which is why he is more promoted, even though his degree of pseudoscience was more pronounced.

Spot on, imo.

This guy quotes Aquinas. I like him.

Haha. It's really just too bad he won't get the experience of being called a stupid faggot by ARM.

@GetCynical @KingOfWhiteAmerica

[–] • 0 pt (edited )

This guy quotes Aquinas. I like him.

The original doubting thomas, whos questioning only lead him deeper. Either the ultimate explainer or the ultimate apologist.

Haha. It's really just too bad he won't get the experience of being called a stupid faggot by ARM.

???

Also I want to clarify something about the following:

What I'm suggesting is there are not just blackboxes that are opaque from the outside looking in, but also blackboxes opaque from the inside looking out. And how would this appear if this is true of our universe? It would appear as a universe with no beginning, and probably no end

It appears I'm contradicting myself, where first I forbid blackboxes, and then I permit them, but thats not entirely true.

I'm only suggesting that supposing the universe is created from something or nothing makes no difference, because without a definite beginning that we can mark, the problem is undecidable. it's reducible to the equivalent of being inside a blackbox thats opaque from the inside. So even supposing for example that blackholes were perfect traps for information, blackboxes, it would make the universe the opposite: a white hole. Information leaves the system but can never enter it at the same place it leaves, wherever or however it happens to do so. And because of the equivalence between wormholes and entanglement (recently discovered), proving information couldn't leak from at least some blackholes, would likely provide some evidence toward the hypothesis that our universe is or exists in a white hole, and its contents, information or material, originate 'somewhere' else, in a blackhole universe entangled with our own.

In this case that 'blackhole' universe, in our hypothetical simulation, would be the 'beginning' of our universe, big bang or whatever it happens to be, or the initial entanglement event, and would thus allow us to measure the 'external world' and its "wall clock time" relative to our own universe assuming the 'program' or our hypothetical universe has never been stopped from running at some point past t=0.

[–] • 1 pt

The original doubting thomas

Little-known fact: "doubting Thomas" actually is a reference to the Gospels (John 20:24-28 (biblegateway.com)), wherein the disciple Thomas says, after being told by the other disciples that Christ rose from the dead:

"Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the place of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe."

So technically the Apostle himself would be the "original".

Aquinas is for sure an echo of his namesake though.

@Chiro

[–] • 1 pt (edited )

Haha. It's really just too bad he won't get the experience of being called a stupid faggot by ARM.

Just a joke; it's a callback to the conversations PS, King, and I had been having with ARM at Voat. ARM was an atheist, and it was his style to insult us in myriad ways. It was a charming kind of abrasiveness though, which we grew to love. You knew you were doing well if ARM called you a retarded faggot, haha. I was saying it was too bad you wouldn't get to earn your badge by being called a faggot by him (he was banned from this site).

@PS