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It would take a large amount of room to completely summarize the evolutionary argument for religious belief. If you're interested to know what the theory consists of, I would highly recommend reading the following paper. It does an excellent job of fully explaining the contemporary understanding of the evolution of religious belief. (If you're a person that denies evolution altogether, forget it for a moment; we'll be granting that it's true for argument's sake.)

https://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/BIOT_a_00018.pdf

If you're like me, you'll find the argument made there extremely compelling. I mean...it's good. There doesn't appear to be a single stone unturned. A rational person, who'd been inclined toward belief prior to reading this paper, could very easily walk away convinced against the proposition that God is real, or that anything in Christianity (or any other religion for that matter) points to something real.

There is, however, a glaring contradiction in this theory's logic. I am not interested here to pick apart the paper in terms of its specific points. If you'd care to do that after reading the paper, we can do that in the comments. I want to attack a specific assumption made by the paper which is given barely any attention, but which is crucial for its thesis to go through.

Essentially, the argument goes that belief in the supernatural, namely God (and all of the associated social effects of this), were the cause of - not just society's survival - but for the evolution of our society's complexity, and even the sophistication of our cultural practices and institutions, including the development of science (by implication). The paper is concerned with showing the combination of factors that caused religious belief to evolve.

But inserted at the tail end of the paper, after a summary of the combination of factors that causes religion to evolve, is the sneaky phrase:

None of these evolved for religion per se.

This is quite literally the only sentence in the paper which even alludes to the underlying assumption on which the whole theory rests.

What this statement truly says, is that: "None of the factors which contributed to the evolution of religious belief did so because religious belief is true. They each represent independent forces, and religion is basically an accident that emerged from them, which just so happened to be super beneficial." In other words, it's not possible that the object of religious belief, God, is true - instead, all of the factors that came together that made you believe in God are themselves what do all of the work of helping you survive reality.

In the highly critical words of Winnie the Pooh: Oh, bother.

Think about this for a moment. The same combination of factors that caused you to believe in God, is also the same set of factors that caused your society to transcend its primitive state and to begin to discover the truth of the universe via the scientific institution. The former is a counterintuitive belief, according to these two researchers, and the latter is not.

One thing the paper stresses is that our 'supernatural beliefs' are counterintuitive, which is to say that belief in God runs contrary to our regular intuitions about the world. Let's be charitable. Let's grant them that.

Yet, what are we to contrast these counterintuitive God beliefs with? Well, the scientist writing the paper implicitly assumes that the beliefs we can trust about the universe would be our scientific ones. Hmm. Situate this in the evolutionary paradigm, in which everything is attempting to balance tradeoffs and costs of new adaptations for survival against an environment that kills us for getting it wrong, regularly.

So our counter-intuitive beliefs in God were the result of a combination of factors that caused society to evolve massive complexity and intelligence, including the ability to finally gain a scientific (apparently intuitive) grasp of the universe, but this same combination of factors didn't evolve because God was true. God was the counterintuitive part, and science was the intuitive (and true) result, and we should think science tells us true things about reality, but the very belief in God that led us there was an irrational accident.

The combination of factors that evolved to produce belief in God didn't "evolve for religious [truth], per se", but they did evolve to lead us to scientific truth, per se?

Based on what? The paper stipulates that belief in the supernatural (God, heaven, hell, etc.) is counterintuitive, but that our regular intuitive ontologies and observations of the world are supposedly something we ought to put actual stock in.

I wonder how well this holds up in 2021. How intuitive is current cosmology? How intuitive is the Big Bang? How intuitive is quantum mechanics? How intuitive is the mathematical concept of infinity? We are told in this paper that the factors which promoted the evolution of belief in God did not do so because God is true, but that they contributed to the increase in intelligence in mankind that did lead us to so-called true knowledge in the sciences.

I'm emphasizing the evolutionary context because the only thing that matters in this context is survival. There are either adaptations which confer greater survivability, or there are spandrels. But the theory is clear that the belief in God was a causal force in the advancement that led to greater knowledge of the universe, and higher survivability. Is this really a case for God being a spandrel? A spandrel is an accident. A spandrel does not build a church - which leads us to question whether the belief in God is rationally counterintuitive if this very belief opened mankind up to expanding into the real universe in ways it would not have otherwise. Talk about shooting the horse you rode in on.

What do you think? Was God a spandrel?

It would take a large amount of room to completely summarize the evolutionary argument for religious belief. If you're interested to know what the theory consists of, I would highly recommend reading the following paper. It does an excellent job of fully explaining the contemporary understanding of the evolution of religious belief. (If you're a person that denies evolution altogether, forget it for a moment; we'll be granting that it's true for argument's sake.) https://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/BIOT_a_00018.pdf If you're like me, you'll find the argument made there extremely *compelling*. I mean...it's *good*. There doesn't appear to be a single stone unturned. A rational person, who'd been inclined toward belief prior to reading this paper, could very easily walk away convinced against the proposition that God is real, or that anything in Christianity (or any other religion for that matter) points to something real. There is, however, a glaring contradiction in this theory's logic. I am not interested here to pick apart the paper in terms of its specific points. If you'd care to do that after reading the paper, we can do that in the comments. I want to attack a specific assumption made by the paper which is given barely any attention, but which is crucial for its thesis to go through. Essentially, the argument goes that belief in the supernatural, namely God (and all of the associated social effects of this), were the cause of - not just society's survival - but for the evolution of our society's complexity, and even the sophistication of our cultural practices and institutions, including the development of science (by implication). The paper is concerned with showing the *combination of factors* that caused religious belief to evolve. But inserted at the tail end of the paper, after a summary of the combination of factors that causes religion to evolve, is the sneaky phrase: >None of these evolved for religion per se. This is quite literally the only sentence in the paper which even alludes to the underlying assumption on which the whole theory rests. What this statement truly says, is that: "None of the factors which contributed to the evolution of religious belief did so because religious belief is true. They each represent independent forces, and religion is basically an accident that emerged from them, which just so happened to be super beneficial." In other words, it's not possible that the object of religious belief, God, is *true* - instead, all of the factors that came together that made you believe in God are *themselves* what do all of the work of helping you survive reality. In the highly critical words of Winnie the Pooh: Oh, bother. Think about this for a moment. The same combination of factors that caused you to believe in God, is also the same set of factors that caused your society to transcend its primitive state and to begin to discover the *truth* of the universe via the scientific institution. The former is a counterintuitive belief, according to these two researchers, and the latter is not. One thing the paper stresses is that our 'supernatural beliefs' are **counterintuitive**, which is to say that belief in God runs contrary to our regular intuitions about the world. Let's be charitable. Let's grant them that. Yet, what are we to contrast these counterintuitive God beliefs with? Well, the scientist writing the paper implicitly assumes that the beliefs we *can trust* about the universe would be our scientific ones. Hmm. Situate this in the evolutionary paradigm, in which everything is attempting to balance tradeoffs and costs of new adaptations for survival against an environment that kills us for getting it wrong, regularly. So our counter-intuitive beliefs in God were the result of a combination of factors that caused society to evolve massive complexity and intelligence, including the ability to finally gain a scientific (apparently *intuitive*) grasp of the universe, but this same combination of factors didn't evolve because God was true. God was the counterintuitive part, and science was the intuitive (and true) result, and we should think science tells us true things about reality, but the very belief in God that led us there was an irrational accident. The combination of factors that evolved to produce belief in God didn't "evolve for religious [truth], per se", but they did evolve to lead us to scientific truth, per se? Based on what? The paper stipulates that belief in the supernatural (God, heaven, hell, etc.) is *counterintuitive*, but that our regular intuitive ontologies and observations of the world are supposedly something we ought to put actual stock in. I wonder how well this holds up in 2021. How intuitive is current cosmology? How intuitive is the Big Bang? How intuitive is quantum mechanics? How intuitive is the mathematical concept of infinity? We are told in this paper that the factors which promoted the evolution of belief in God did not do so because God is true, but that they contributed to the increase in intelligence in mankind that *did lead* us to so-called true knowledge in the sciences. I'm emphasizing the evolutionary context because the only thing that matters in this context is survival. There are either adaptations which confer greater survivability, or there are [spandrels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spandrel_(biology)#:~:text=In%20evolutionary%20biology%2C%20a%20spandrel,direct%20product%20of%20adaptive%20selection.&text=Gould%20and%20Lewontin%20sought%20to,more%20structuralist%20view%20of%20evolution.). But the theory is clear that the belief in God *was a causal force* in the advancement that led to greater knowledge of the universe, and higher survivability. Is this really a case for God being a spandrel? A spandrel is an accident. A spandrel does not build a church - which leads us to question whether the belief in God is rationally counterintuitive if this very belief opened mankind up to expanding into the real universe in ways it would not have otherwise. Talk about shooting the horse you rode in on. What do you think? Was God a spandrel?

(post is archived)

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ToM is theory of mind.

It basically represents our folk psychological theories, how we model other minds in terms of explaining the behaviors of others. We handle the problem of other minds by attempting to internally model them (empathizing or putting 'ourselves in their shoes'). A ToM would be how we judged someone's expressions about their hand (which we can't see directly) when we play poker. I see this facial expression...why might I make that face if I were him? In other words, it is an adaptation for decision making with sub-optimal information or, in principle, inaccessible information.

That theory is supposed to transfer in terms of its tendency to agent-seek to phenomena we cannot explain according to our current theories. Ancient man encounters thunderstorm, cannot explain this complex event in any reductive way to meteorology or chemistry or physics, so it must be the intentional act of a storm god.

Many would say our tendency to believe in the supernatural is an over-extension of faculties that were very useful in dealing with other people, perhaps even trying to figure out our own mother's behaviors as young people, for example. (How do I get that boob...I'm starving!)

Of course, all of this is based on a LOT of assumption. Just because something sounds intuitively reasonable, does not make it true of reality.

There is something about this that still bothers me very much...that anything we cannot explain is treated as a living and intentional being.

Perhaps there is survival advantage in this, but something about it all is an insult to mind itself. There is kind of a 'church of progress' pomp in it, which looks back on all ancient people and finds blithering idiots, who can build fire and shape tools but at the first sign of a weather event, fall to their knees at muh sky person.

I don't know why it isn't right, but I am confident it's not.

Like I said, It would seem that some accurate mental facsimile of the world is too resource intensive.

I agree with this completely, however, as that mental model abstracts from the complexity of the world and begins to assemble stereotypes and heuristic behaviors, it runs a great risk. If the model is too simple, you're dead.

To be robust enough, we would expect there to be an underlying logic, which did not simply go from the real world into Candyland because of a need to simplify. We need to be careful not to let imagination be a cart we place before the horse.

This brain had to evolve in a live-or-die situation long before we developed imaginative faculties. There must be underlying logical structures involved in our modeling which would be unfavorable toward belief (only for the sake of simplifying the world) in fairy dust as a useful theory of the unknown threats in the world.

@PS

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Ok. That makes sense. We were thinking along the same lines, although you don’t like these particular lines.

Don’t think of it so much as primitive man being a moron. Think of it as primitive man being a different kind of moron.

Look at the belief of modern hunter-gatherers like native americans or australian abos. They think spirits live in rocks and trees. New guineans believed they could acquire the power of other people by eating their brains or flesh. There are comparable tales about pagan europeans and middle easterners. Lots of human sacrifice attested to with the Celts, the Greeks, the Norse, the Hebrews, etc. Candyland type shit. Less than 100 generations ago.

How much have we progressed? SJWs believe in something called gender which afaik is not a naturally observable trait, seemingly inferred to exist by purely intuitive (spiritual?) means, which varies independently of biological sex and must be accomodated on your driver’s license! This is bonkers. An interesting turn of events for progress and the rational atheists .

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The way that I have defeated myself is where I've been forced to deal with the fact that the brain doesn't operate on atomic beliefs. It isn't like a juke box that functions on the basis of a single belief at one time, in a queue.

Higher consciousness is something that works on theories, where it isn't even as simple as a bunch of atomic beliefs coherently forming a group. Within a theory you get these strange non-linear effects of compound beliefs.

There is also the issue of dissonance. There is too much evidence for this to deny. Basically, we can have beliefs that conflict and challenge an overall theory, even within the same theory (hence, the gender issues you mentioned).

It boils down to any mind's ability to tolerate dissonance, and perhaps we'd think that some dissonance is tolerable if the overall theory that results does some extraordinary things in terms of behaviors.

For now, I just can't get my argument through. I won't stop thinking about it. But as it stands, I don't see any way to swat down this possibility for evolution to result in false beliefs.

For example, maybe it is possible we get to a primitive supernatural belief first by considering an afterlife. Once you arrive at a tradition of dead ancestor worship, after life belief (which is only perhaps moderately supernatural), with some early moral beliefs...getting to the authentically supernatural is probably not a tremendous leap.

Of course, none of this rules out that these beliefs do in fact point to real facts about reality. They just make it currently unfeasible to go the route I wanted to.

@PS

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the brain doesn't operate on atomic beliefs.

Agree. This is really a critical point.

dissonance

Also agree. I personally suffer from this all the time.

For now, I just can't get my argument through. I won't stop thinking about it.

I look foward to more on the subject.

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Perhaps there is a creator that has designed us this way to understand another aspect of reality that is not otherwise detectable to us? That is possible. But there is no evidence of that IMO. And then of course you have to deal with another question, i.e. where does the creator come from?

If there possibly exists another aspect of reality that you admit could be "not otherwise detectable to us", and if there possibly exists a Creator Who designed us to be able to grasp this alternative aspect in ways possibly beyond our nature, then - with those as premises - does it not follow that it could also possibly be the case that the principal means of detecting this Creator is by the same means we are enabled to detect that "other aspect of reality", which is to say, "beyond our nature"? And if this is the case, is it really fair to hold belief in God to the same standard applied to empirical matters?

What I am saying is that science - and I use this as a placeholder for empirical investigation generally - is necessarily epistemically closed. There are questions that fall within its scope, and there are matters that are beyond its scope. In fact, as @Chiro has noted elsewhere recently, the very premises that enable the scientific enterprise in the first place are themselves not provable on scientific grounds. There must be certain principles upon which science is based, the truth of which are not and cannot be established scientifically.

If principles such as the law of noncontradiction are not scientific, but rather logical or even self-evident, then should we be surprised if the existence of such a possible Creator, per se, cannot be evidenced empirically? In other words, if there are principles that can only be evidenced / proven by logical argument, and if there are first principles that cannot even be demonstrated by virtue of their self-evidence, then is it not reasonable to suppose that this possible Creator is likewise either self-evident, or only demonstrable logically - or by some other non-empirical means?

I will point out that I do not think the existence of the Creator is self-evident, precisely because His existence can be demonstrated.

You were raised Catholic. I don't think I need to go through the cosmological arguments for you. Does this mean you believe they do not prove what they purport to prove? And on what grounds / by what counter-arguments do you reject them?

I don't see how the necessity of a necessary being, given contingent being, can be avoided.

I don't see how the necessity of a first cause, given intermediary causes, can be avoided.

I don't see how the necessity of a being without any unactualized potential, given imperfect beings with some unactualized potential, can be avoided.

I don't see how the necessity of a supreme intelligence, given the existence of non-supreme intelligences, can be avoided.

I don't see how these apparent necessities fail to constitute logical evidence for the existence of God. Whether I want to argue for other Divine attributes, or that this God also Incarnated Himself, and then died for our sake, is a separate matter.

As for your question about where the Creator comes from, the point is that God is necessary precisely because of the problem of infinite regression. An infinite regression of an actually infinite series is logically impossible. Yet there are obviously a variety of existing series. Therefore there must be a beginning for each. Where God came from is not an issue, precisely because our positing of Him is the solution to that question - God is, by definition, that Being that does not require a cause.

How did the theory of a sky father arise? Accidentally probably through the same neurological structures that help us understand an idea like “Father”. So accidentally, but not entirely randomly.

It arose because, as grounded creatures, things above us are typically more commonly out of our reach than things below us. We see clouds, birds, stars, the moon and the sun, and know that we cannot reach them, whereas the grass or dirt or stones beneath us are more readily accessible. Thus mankind comes to associate "up" or "higher" with "superior" (a Latin word which literally means above, but whose connotation for us today transcends spatial relation). That which is above is better, that which is below is lesser. Given the reasonableness for this association to be made, the "sky" aspect of sky father is readily explainable.

As for father, for most of human history and especially during our critical "infancy" as a species, our fathers were the strongest member of the families; they naturally were leaders of households, and held supreme authority over the family; their very physiology suggested activity, giving, whereas the female suggested passivity and receiving. The father was the "superior" member in the intimate context of the family.

Taking these two associations together, it can readily be seen how basically all peoples throughout the world would come to believe that there was a sky father - just as each family has a head, so too does all creation have a Head, and He lives not in the earth, which is beneath man, but in the sky, which is beyond man's reach.

Thus solves the riddle of why man would associate God with a sky father. The real question is why man should posit a God in the first place.

The answer to this is likewise straightforward, though you may not like it. Primitive man was smarter than modern man. I don't mean mathematically, or technologically, or literarily, or even artistically. I mean philosophically and logically. Whereas today, people who are untrained in philosophy or logic will readily assert that infinite regression is possible, or that what I see as blue you see as (what I see as) red, or that moral oughts are merely utilitarian conveniences drawn up at will, and are therefore relativizeable to some extent, or even that effects do not require causes. These are the kinds of absurdities that lead to the very perversions modernity engages in daily that both you and @Chiro have been discussing. My point here is that such absurd beliefs are only possible through bad education. People do not naturally believe in such nonsense; an education establishment, a gaslighting media, and already-fooled masses of people offering daily negative feedback to the loop are required to sustain such a farce. In ancient times, when all the separate cultures were coming up with their notions of sky fathers, these corrupt and malicious institutions did not exist. And so people took it for granted that effects have causes, that there are no actually existing infinite series, and that whatever "ought" is, it applies to you as well as me.

Taking such truths as granted, and seeing the world as consisting of contingent being, effects of causes, and degrees of perfection - even if they lacked the language or sophistication to express such ideas in these ways - and it follows naturally that people would envision a God. They recognize as unavoidable the same thing I said I see as unavoidable above - that there must have been a First Cause, a Most Perfect being, etc. And I'm not saying that the primitives of old were walking around with Aquinas' cosmological arguments flowing through their heads - I'm saying that these arguments, when just recognized rather than expressed, are so intuitive, and so simple, that they were indeed taken for granted. It did not require a Thomistic formulation - it was sufficient for a man to see that he was the son of his father, and that his father was the son of his grandfather, to recognize that this must not have been going on forever, but must have had a beginning - and that whatever this beginning was, it would not apply just to his family, but to all families. And since I've already pointed out that the family was the most intimate association with which ancient man was familiar, and that the father was the obvious head of this union, that it easily followed, universally, that people decided that there was (or is) a God-Creator, Who was (or is) a sky father. This didn't require a long process of reasoning; it was practically obvious to everyone. And whether a culture decided that God was, or still is, might follow from an equally intuitive notion that whatever could have been the cause of everything they knew of must be so powerful as to still exist; or it might have arisen from a perception of lighting, and a sense that obviously He still exists based on that. As I've already noted, whether these particular "mythologizing" elements led to true beliefs or false beliefs about God, whether they emerged due to lack of scientific knowledge, is irrelevant to the utter truth of the original recognition that God in fact exists, and that this recognition is a true belief.

[–] 0 pt (edited )

Damn good response. You pointed out something that I stressed in my most recent comment that is so important, which has to do with the way we come to believe something - and the belief's kind of justification.

These people may not have had Aquinas's arguments. If these ancient beliefs were largely phenomenological and not strictly logical, this would give them an intuitive character. What this leaves open is the possibility that a people could develop a true belief on the basis of false beliefs - that is, some reasoning (which might be considered weak in terms of modern ideas about reasoning) could result in a belief which is actually true.

That a fire produces light and heat means the sun is a similar substance...this wouldn't be good empirical reasoning, but nonetheless it doesn't lead to a perfectly false belief, no? It is truer than it is false, and it points to a universal truth which might be difficult to articulate - something more abstract about sources of heat and light. So it is almost like we have to look at beliefs in layers. The surface layer can be wrong objectively, but point to broader and more universal truths.

Similarly, with the example you gave about families. The intuition about infinite regress of families is not excellent logic, but it is intuitive and analogical, and does point to an important logical argument for the cosmos itself (which these ancient people were not strictly making).

Nevertheless, the belief which resulted winds up being truer than it is false.

Last but not least, all of this discussion has left out other epistemic channels besides conscious reasoning, ala those emphasized by Jung. These cannot be ignored in the bigger picture.

There is good reason to think we know things before we know them.

@BurnInHelena

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There is something important to say here, which is that I want it to be clear where I agreed to draw the starting line.

The logic of the term 'supernatural' is something I set out not to question a priori. In reality, this would have been one of my initial points of attack. To see what I mean, consider Hume's fork. This is an oft-cited principle of the empiricist, the metaphysical status of which is rarely appreciated.

Basically, it states that there are only two possible categories of human reasoning: relations of ideas and matters of fact. The former would be conceptual analysis. The latter would be the facts of natural science.

The interesting question is, does the fork apply to itself? The only answer can be that it does not. It is neither a conceptual truth, nor is it a truth of science. Likewise, the logic of the term supernatural presupposes the truth of the fork, i.e. that if something is not a member of the theories of natural science, then it wins the prefix super.

But this begs the question, and is fundamentally self-refuting.

The method of science is presupposing the boundary on existential claims, by way of an epistemic closure on only what is discoverable by its own method. Again, this is circular.

You cannot put epistemology before metaphysics. If I reject the classification of a belief as supernatural on these grounds, then the original argument of these researchers never gets off the ground. We are left asking the question about what justifies the definition of inclusion under 'natural'.

But, putting the epistemology before the metaphysics is exactly what I agreed to do by trying to argue within this framework. This was probably being overly generous to my own abilities, because in the context of arguing the positive case for God (and keeping in mind the history of all arguments for God), I basically agreed to a fight with my legs broken before round one.

I can simply reject the supernatural distinction and say that there is no reason to suspect that belief in God is a false belief, on the back of any metaphysical case I wanted to choose. Then, the so-called problem of the evolutionary case for religion is a wash. Belief in God didn't evolve any more than our belief that we are thinking things evolved. We believe it simply because they are true beliefs.

The absence of higher reasoning and rigorous logical arguments to justify the belief in God by these ancient peoples is not better evidence that their beliefs were unjustified, than their lack of understanding the nature of consciousness was evidence that their belief in selfhood was unjustified.

For myriad reasons, one can have a true belief without the commensurate ability to justify their reasons for the belief.

I'll hang my hat here for the moment. Let me stress I am not saying this to avoid the failure. I love the failure of my other approach. I consider it temporary! I just thought the glaring problem of this term supernatural needed to be pointed out. I have been using it all along without ever specifying that I ultimately think it is bogus.

@PS

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I'll hang my hat here for the moment. Let me stress I am not saying this to avoid the failure. I love the failure of my other approach. I consider it temporary! I just thought the glaring problem of this term supernatural needed to be pointed out.

I actually think this is the solution to your difficulty. When you said

For now, I just can't get my argument through. I won't stop thinking about it. But as it stands, I don't see any way to swat down this possibility for evolution to result in false beliefs.

the first thing I thought of what Plantinga's well-refined Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. But the key here is that it is an argument that assumes the premises that both evolution and naturalism are true. By bringing the prefix super into this issue, I think you are recognizing that the task you have set out depends on whether one holds to a naturalistic evolution, or a nonnaturalistic one. Evolution and naturalism are often conflated, but as ARM would be quick to remind us, they are different categories and must be treated separately.

Plantinga argues that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then we actually have no reason whatever to suppose are beliefs are reliable. We only have reason to suppose that our beliefs are survival-beneficial. We also have to understand that we cannot take our experience of reality as we know it and glean from that that our beliefs are reliable, because we can't assume that this reality is defined by naturalism and evolution both being true. Thus we can't use our experience of apparently reliable beliefs as evidence contra Plantinga's argument; the argument aims to show what would be the case if both evolution and naturalism were true. The short form of the argument, without any exposition, runs as follows:

1) The probability of having reliable beliefs given naturalism and evolution is low

2) Anyone who accepts (1) and believes that naturalism and evolution are true, has a defeater for the belief in the reliability of beliefs.

3) Anyone who has a defeater for the belief in reliable beliefs has a defeater for any other belief one holds, including the belief in naturalism and evolution.

4) If belief in naturalism and evolution necessarily leads to a defeater for the belief in naturalism and evolution, then belief in naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and cannot be rationally held.

Proving (1) is obviously the critical step. And again, it amounts to differentiating between "cognitive indicators", like true data gathered from an environment to enable adaptive behaviour, versus true beliefs about this data or the environment. It is not clear that the beliefs themselves have to be clear for the cognitive data to be nonetheless received and processed adaptively. And so if the belief-about-data, for any given datum, is just as likely true as false, and if we expect "reliability of beliefs" to be defined, let's say, by a 3:1 ratio of true to false beliefs, then given a mere 0.5 probability of a belief being true, the probability of achieving these 3:1 ratio is a belief set of 1,000 beliefs is small enough that we can no longer consider beliefs as reliable, given naturalism and evolution.

That is a very brief summary of the argument. Plantinga goes into great detail attempting to pre-emptively answer specific objections, or dealing with semantical arguments, but if it is not necessarily the case that true beliefs would accompany true cognitive data, then I think the entire argument follows, and, indeed, I would agree with you in saying that one cannot "swat down the idea" of evolution resulting in false beliefs - in fact, if we are taking the conjunction of evolution and naturalism as true, it would seem it is just as probable for evolution (and naturalism) to produce false beliefs as true.

Which brings me back to how I began this comment. By bringing the prefix super into this argument, you are subtly gesturing to a theistic evolution, which is something entirely different from the "naturalism and evolution" conjunction. A conjunction, instead, of theism and evolution would, I think necessarily, lead to the reliability of beliefs, for the simple fact that, in this case, evolution would not be random - or rather, it would not be selecting merely for survival, but instead evolution would have been designed for the sake of selecting for gnosis - the ability of the evolved creature to understand the universe, and by extension, God. Which brings us to one of those critical three principles of natural law that mankind has, whether he knows it or not, come to reject as a result of the Protestant Reformation on the side of the religious right, and as a result of the Enlightenment on the side of the secular left - namely, the principle of the intelligiblity of the universe.

A principle, I might add, that anthropic realism - held by those "moronic primitives" - itself assumes.

@BurnInHelena