Damn good response. You pointed out something that I stressed in my most recent comment that is so important, which has to do with the way we come to believe something - and the belief's kind of justification.
These people may not have had Aquinas's arguments. If these ancient beliefs were largely phenomenological and not strictly logical, this would give them an intuitive character. What this leaves open is the possibility that a people could develop a true belief on the basis of false beliefs - that is, some reasoning (which might be considered weak in terms of modern ideas about reasoning) could result in a belief which is actually true.
That a fire produces light and heat means the sun is a similar substance...this wouldn't be good empirical reasoning, but nonetheless it doesn't lead to a perfectly false belief, no? It is truer than it is false, and it points to a universal truth which might be difficult to articulate - something more abstract about sources of heat and light. So it is almost like we have to look at beliefs in layers. The surface layer can be wrong objectively, but point to broader and more universal truths.
Similarly, with the example you gave about families. The intuition about infinite regress of families is not excellent logic, but it is intuitive and analogical, and does point to an important logical argument for the cosmos itself (which these ancient people were not strictly making).
Nevertheless, the belief which resulted winds up being truer than it is false.
Last but not least, all of this discussion has left out other epistemic channels besides conscious reasoning, ala those emphasized by Jung. These cannot be ignored in the bigger picture.
There is good reason to think we know things before we know them.
that is, some reasoning (which might be considered weak in terms of modern ideas about reasoning) could result in a belief which is actually true.
Read the comment I just made in response to you, especially my concluding remark about the unique implications of specifically theistic evolution, and then re-read the above-quoted sentence. I think you will find the underlying theme is the same, or that something similar is being suggested: if evolution is a natural process specifically designed to enable creatures, and man specifically, to know the universe and by extension God, then would we not expect man, during a more "intellectually vulnerable" period of his existence, to be formed towards belief in God, even as a result of false beliefs? And isn't it fitting that, by the time we were intellectually mature enough to understand that, no, lighting is not directly caused by God, we were also mature enough to have formally structured arguments for what was initially only intuitive?
Excellent, and yes.
Considering the assumptions I was making about evolution, I think you are very correct to point out that I was assuming telos in evolution. I was trying to make theistic evolution mesh with non-theistic evolution. It was doomed from the get go.
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