Now this is a SPICY ruling
Now this is a SPICY ruling
Highlights:
The government argues to the contrary, pointing to language in Heller that suggests the unconstitutionality of machinegun regulation would be “startling,” and that the Second Amendment only applies to weapons that were commonly used by law-abiding citizens at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment
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Second, the government’s interpretation would run directly counter to the essential analysis in Heller: just as the Fourth Amendment applies to modern “searches,” the Second Amendment applies to arms that did not exist at the country’s founding.
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Defendant argues that the government cannot meet its burden to show that § 922(o) is consistent with this nation’s history of firearm regulation. (Doc. 26 at 8–9.) To meet its burden, the government advances only two potential historical analogs. First, the government points to English common law, which it asserts prohibited riding or going armed with dangerous or usual weapons. (Doc. 28 at 7 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 148– 49 (1769).) Second, the government cites one case from the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1824 that recognized an offense to arm oneself “with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people.” (Id. at 7–8 (citing State v. Langford, 3 Hawks 381, 383 (NC 1824).) But both examples are disanalogous to what Defendant is charged with here—simple possession of a machinegun.
The Government is attempting to use a Common Law statute from England in 1328 (which the court goes on to cite and analyze).
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To summarize, in this case, the government has not met its burden under Bruen and Rahimi to demonstrate through historical analogs that regulation of the weapons at issue in this case are consistent with the nation’s history of firearms regulation. Indeed, the government has barely tried to meet that burden. And the Supreme Court has indicated that the Bruen analysis is not merely a suggestion.
Highlights:
>The government argues to the contrary, pointing to language in Heller that suggests the unconstitutionality of machinegun regulation would be “startling,” and that the Second Amendment only applies to weapons that were commonly used by law-abiding citizens at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment
...
>Second, the government’s interpretation would run directly counter to the essential analysis in Heller: just as the Fourth Amendment applies to modern “searches,” the Second Amendment applies to arms that did not exist at the country’s founding.
...
>Defendant argues that the government cannot meet its burden to show that § 922(o) is consistent with this nation’s history of firearm regulation. (Doc. 26 at 8–9.) To meet its burden, the government advances only two potential historical analogs. First, the government points to English common law, which it asserts prohibited riding or going armed with dangerous or usual weapons. (Doc. 28 at 7 (citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 148– 49 (1769).) Second, the government cites one case from the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1824 that recognized an offense to arm oneself “with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people.” (Id. at 7–8 (citing State v. Langford, 3 Hawks 381, 383 (NC 1824).) But both examples are disanalogous to what Defendant is charged with here—simple possession of a machinegun.
The Government is attempting to use a Common Law statute from England in 1328 (which the court goes on to cite and analyze).
...
>To summarize, in this case, the government has not met its burden under Bruen and Rahimi to demonstrate through historical analogs that regulation of the weapons at issue in this case are consistent with the nation’s history of firearms regulation. Indeed, the government has barely tried to meet that burden. And the Supreme Court has indicated that the Bruen analysis is not merely a suggestion.
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