Well said and nice commentary.
From the Summa Contra Gentiles, Part 2, Chapter 64:
...the nature of harmony pertains to the qualities of the body rather than to those of the soul; thus, health consists in a kind of harmony of the humours; strength, in a certain harmony of sinews and bones; beauty, in harmony of limbs and colors.
So, indeed, rather than beauty being a subjective thing "in the eye of the beholder", it depends on harmony, which is objective.
And further to Chiro's thoughts (with an answer to "problem of evil" concerns to boot):
Moreover, perfect goodness would not be found in created things unless there were an order of goodness in them, in the sense that some of them are better than others. Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another. The highest beauty would be taken away from things, too, if the order of distinct and unequal things were removed. And what is more, multiplicity would be taken away from things if inequality of goodness were removed, since through the differences by which things are distinguished from each other one thing stands out as better than another; for instance, the animate in relation to the inanimate, and the rational in regard to the irrational. And so, if complete equality were present in things, there would be but one created good, which clearly disparages the perfection of the creature. Now, it is a higher grade of goodness for a thing to be good because it cannot fall from goodness; lower than that is the thing which can fall from goodness. So, the perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness. But it pertains to the providence of the governor to preserve perfection in the things governed, and not to decrease it. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine goodness, entirely to exclude from things the power of falling from the good. But evil is the consequence of this power, because what is able to fall does fall at times. And this defection of the good is evil, as we showed above. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to prohibit evil entirely from things. (Part 3, Chapter 71).
You guys would make terrible boyfriends.
Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another.
That's very important. It relies on a simple metaphysical dichotomy of difference and sameness. Nothing can be like God, except inasmuch as other things can be unlike God.
And so, if complete equality were present in things, there would be but one created good, which clearly disparages the perfection of the creature.
This is also very interesting. It seems to divide perfection between God and the creature. The perfection of God just is its unity, but perfection across all creatures is in their multiplicity. The term 'across all' is paramount. Because insofar as any individual creature can be like God, this relies on the multiplicity of the creature, and therefore this is the grounds for the many being more perfect than the one in creation.
Since the distinction between what is good because it cannot err from what is good but which can err is a distinction which results from differentiation, then the good which is inherent in the degree of difference itself between these two categories is also a good which could not have existed without multiplicity and difference. In other words, from out of the degrees themselves a good in itself emerges, making the multiplicity of creation a higher good.
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