You are WRONG! I explained this already. There is a Proposition P or a Condition C, and there is the Justification J for the proposition P or the condition C.
You are like "the definitions of X must include x, y, and z". Let's call that the claim. But C is already used by "Condition".
So here you are defining goodness with all the ingredients of intent and purpose and goal and truth and beauty and honor and whatever your ingredients are.
As if that's "just what it means" to to be good or evil, as a requirement.
That it's "just in the name 'good' or 'evil", that X and Y must have properties x, y, z.
And here I was like, what is the J for C such that J->C.
And you must maintain that J->C because the definitions of 'good' or 'evil" must have properties x, y, z.
So I feel that 'good' and 'evil' do not "just have" those requirements, and require a distinct J.
Whereas you must maintain that the existence of C or P itself implies J. That C or P itself is identical to J.
So the theist's concept of "God" or "good" must be that it is "self-justifying by one's own name", whereas the atheist's concept of "God" or "good" does not refer to something which is "self-justifying by one's own name."
So the atheist is not using the same word as the theist, for "God", (or he is?). And the theist is not sharing the definition/referent of the atheist's use of the token "God".
So either the atheist thinks that a) the theist and atheist are talking "past" each other, or b) the atheist properly references what the theist calls "God" in the atheistic proposition "God does not exist."
If a), then that's not really atheism, but more of an "agnosticism" based on dispute about something nominal or ontological in nature. That is, there is dispute between atheists and theists over the term "God" and its metaproperties if any, and so the truth value of a singular proposition about "God's" existence can't be asserted without undecidability or ambiguity.
Or b), That the "atheistic premise", ("premise" here rather than "Proposition" emphasizes the role as the antecedent of a conditional, rather than its nature as a property.)...
... ... b) The "atheist premise" implies theism.
In a way that does not or might not imply atheism where theism is the antecedent.
So here, with talk of the good and moral, I presented compelling "counterexamples" about the "necessary" conditions for something to be good or moral.
You are adopting the strategy that it is wrong to consider those things good, because they fail to meet current definitions.
And I am adopting the strategy that my use of the name involves a better or additionally nuanced requirement, that allows for bizarre counterexamples which defy current definitions, requiring that we alter the definition of the concept.
I'm pointing to an intuitive "sense" of how a word is used by myself as the speaker and the native speaking community at large.
Where as you are pointing to an appeal to definition as such and such to resolve this dispute in a way that does not require addendums or revision to the existing definitions.
It is right to appeal to sense rather than definition in this instance, because I said so.
It is right to appeal to sense rather than definition in this instance, because I said so.
Latin is so valuable as a language precisely because it is "dead" and the meanings, understandings, and connotations of its words do not change. This is one reason why retaining Latin in the Mass is so important (another reason being it is one of the three languages nailed above the head of our Lord, and thus has tremendous power).
Nietzsche was a philologist, which is why he was such a good thinker (even though his conclusions were tainted by the false premises he was raised on, namely a merely heretical sense of Christianity). He knew the original usage of words, and the etymologies of words, and the original usage of the words in which other words were etymologically rooted.
My point is that it is irresponsible to change the meanings of words around and sever oneself from original meanings, from etymology, and the meaning / insight offered by the words upon which other words are based. It just renders discussion / debate more difficult.
Are ideas the products of words, or are words images of ideas? I think anyone who has ever had a thought but "couldn't put it into words" knows that the latter is the case. Thus they are tools, and while this gives us certain flexibility, there are also constraints on the most efficient usage of them. Ultimately the definitions of things are determined by essences, not names - names, indeed, are but nominal labels applied to essences.
And unless we really want to argue there is no essence of "triangularity", then I think my position is justified.
Your last two replies sucked.
(post is archived)