(This might be the best argument I have made to the three of you, ever, and in my opinion.)
Now cue the atheistic response, which consists of outright denying your (definitionally) undeniable first principles (like being is better than non-being, knowing is better than not knowing, and being is good by nature).
I also can't help but notice how Thomistic an argument sounds once it establishes first principles as its foundation.
I'll slow roast you until you believe that non-being is better than being.
That is why I was careful when I made this one. I really only established one self-evident principle. From there, it all follows, and the beauty is none of this relies on the human subject. It would be true of existence whether we were here or not.
That is, of course, unless ARM takes a philosophy on geometry (and mathematics generally) which I doubt if he's willing to.
So the only course of action is to challenge the principle that being is better than not-being.
There are really only two possible ways to attack this, one of which can only address human being. ARM is an antinatalist. He could offer those arguments as a way to suggest (whether or not they hold) that, at the very least, you can't set out being > non-being as self-evident.
This won't work, because I've made an argument that is not contingent on humans.
So he would have to attack the claim that all forms of being are not better than non-being.
To this, I give two thoughts:
First, if we cannot accept this as a self-evident truth, then I think this would make just about any claim to truth absurd. At least as it concerns goodness, I can't imagine any moral theory making it off the ground if we cannot establish this.
Second, In the argument, I point out that the modal considerations of being itself favor the principle being true. If you accept that nothing (simpliciter) is logically possible, then it is better that something should exist rather than nothing.
At minimum, even if we wanted to forego outright moral language, we can say that being is greater than non-being. I think this still permits the principle to go through.
If for something to be greater than another thing, it must exist, then so too the possibility to be lesser depends on existence, for both distinctions rely upon degree.
But here we see that being, then, must also be better than non-being, for non-being is not less than any degree of being. Still, being can be said to be greater, for it is only once existence is that so too there issues any measure of degree.
Therefore if it can be said that being is greater than non-being, it must also be said of being that it is better. It would be the only grounds in which betterness could obtain.
If ARM says that nothingness is logically impossible, then being just is.
This just begs the question. Why can I conceive of non-being if it is logically impossible? I cannot conceive of a square circle or a ball that is both simultaneously red and green all over. But I can conceive of no existence.
If we proceed down this road of Anselm, we find ourselves confronted by the conceivability of ultimate being, or perfect being.
The mystic here says, "Aha! You have just equated nothingness and perfect being."
For surely we have, and yet, since we have established that being just is:
All that we have done is to say that there is not non-being, but that the true dichotomy is God-being and existence, as such.
Hence, the circle. Reality is segregated not between being and non-being, but between the circular path and the center point (God); and when we say being > non-being, all we truly mean to say is that:
God + existence > God
Which is what Christians have always been saying!
(Mic drop)
There are really only two possible ways to attack this
Ah, laying out the best objections to your argument and then responding to them. Now it's really Thomistic.
God + existence > God
In the same way that ∞ + x > ∞, you could perhaps say. A creation manifesting the God Who just is offers new ways of seeing what always was, and new creatures to see Him. Something like infinity generating a finite series that, by this infinite power, can nonetheless relate to the infinity, thereby, paradoxically, generating "more" relations to the Infinite than there were before.
If God did not love, none of this could be possible, for it is His love of the self-manifesting finite that enables its being. And yet, before the finite, was only the infinite, and there is no change in the infinite. Thus God, to love the finite, must have loved before there was any finite. Which means He had to love Himself. Which is precisely what the Trinity illustrates and enables.
In the same way that ∞ + x > ∞, you could perhaps say. A creation manifesting the God Who just is offers new ways of seeing what always was, and new creatures to see Him. Something like infinity generating a finite series that, by this infinite power, can nonetheless relate to the infinity, thereby, paradoxically, generating "more" relations to the Infinite than there were before.
If God did not love, none of this could be possible, for it is His love of the self-manifesting finite that enables its being. And yet, before the finite, was only the infinite, and there is no change in the infinite. Thus God, to love the finite, must have loved before there was any finite. Which means He had to love Himself. Which is precisely what the Trinity illustrates and enables.
Great commentary.
I was thinking about the point you made in these last couple of replies regarding how Thomistic my two posts have been. You're right. That strikes me, because I'm not really very familiar with Aquinas. It makes me wonder, that if you begin from a point like the one where I did, if you can't avoid sounding Thomistic - just because Thomas already did it. Perhaps that kind of use of the intellect will always wind up sounding Thomistic.
I started reading a little bit of Jean Borella, and I was fascinated by how he describes the difference between intelligence and reasoning, and how this differentiates Platonic from Aristotelian/Thomistic thinking. He says that the latter are methodical and they serve revelation, but that Platonic understanding of the intelligence is its transcendent nature, that it effectively ascends the divine hierarchy and parallels the truly gnostic part of Christianity. That's not to discount either of them. They're both massively important for their own reasons.
I'd say that for the most part, the Platonic has factored far more into my thinking than the Thomistic style has, but it was interesting to approach arguing from that standpoint. I definitely see Borella's point, which is that it serves revelation/gnosis, but cannot itself offer that. Thomism is fantastic for analysis, and for getting us to build really strong rational structures that point to God, but the gnostic aspect is necessary to get to the Christian God, I think. It's pure intellect, as opposed to reasoning, that reaches God.
(post is archived)