If God has the metaproperty of "God's name is only ever spoken with intent toward an existent"... ...Then when the atheist "speaks of God", he is speaking with intent to a non-existent. But theism would maintain that "God's name is only ever spoken with intent" is true, where is not true in the case of the atheist speaking the name God. So the theist would maintain that "speaks the name of God with the intent of referencing an existent", is a property of God, or it is good to have that property. But the atheist would maintain that he is the counterexample, because the atheist is referencing the name of God without intent to a nonexistent. But the theist would ask, wouldn't it be better if God's name was only ever spoken with perfect reverence, which means respect to the existence of the thing named, and belief in it? Than to not? And if the atheist agrees that would be better, then the atheist must agree that he is not referencing "God" at all if his intent was irreverent. Something like that. The... the atheist would maintain something like, he is the counterexample that the name "God" is ever used reverentially, or something. So we would think that God, via this one counterexample of the atheist, disproves the existence of God, because the atheist as a matter of fact spoke the name irreverently. ...... But if God was spoken irreverently, then he was intended as a referent which is not always spoken to reverently. But if he was intended as referent which is not always spoken of reverently, then he was not referring to God. But he was referring to God, because he used the word and spelled it "God". So he did use the "name" God. And God is identical to intent. Or to his intent. Then the name of God should also encode the property (or metaproperty?) that name of God encodes the intent for the necessary existence of God or "God" as part of its name or definition. And if "God" does not satisfy that metaproperty, when the atheist utters the word "God", then the atheist is not actually referring to God. But he must be actually referring to God, or actually intending to the existence of God, because God is equal to his intent, and his intent is singular, and his intent affirms his self-existence, and his meta-properties include properties like "name must encode justification of his existence" or "name must encode metaproperty of self-justifying name. So "God" is a "self-justifying name" is either taken as true or as false by either the theist or the atheist. And also, " 'God' is a self-justifying name" is either taken as true or as false by either the theist, or the atheist." Or something... I'm struggling here. Then the theist is refuted, because "God" is not a self-justifying name, but the theist also argues that it is better for the concept of God to possess the metaproperty of having a self-justifying name. So if " 'God' " does not refer to something with a self-justifying name, for instance when the atheist speaks the name irreverently, ..... Then when the atheist utters the atheistic premise, he is using the token 'God' incorrectly, because he is not using it to refer to something with the meta-property of self-justifying name, and of course it would be better that God had that meta-property.... So the atheist can never refute theism... because he can never refer to the object claimed to exist, or referred to, by the tern "God". So the atheist can never state the atheistic premise without implying the existence of God. Which, via reductio, refutes the existence of God. I'm so confused. But I also want to go in the other direction some how, but i'm struggling with it. That the theist contradicts himself if he thinks "God" is not self-justifying. Or.... Then if he has the metaproperty of being a singular property, because literally a metaproperty is defined to be distinct from the property itself, else it shall just refer to itself as a property rather than a metaproperty. So then that metaproperties only exist for objects which have at least at least 2 properties. But "is identical to one's own name" is a metaproperty. Then "God" is a metaproperty of "God". But if God is a "metaproperty" of God, then by definition of "metaproperty", God must possess at least two distinct properties, that is the property and its metaproperty. But this is impossible by divine simplicity and the definition of a singleton. .... I want to reach something like, if God exists, then God does not exist. And if God does not exist, then God exists. And in the context of the atheist and the theist speaking utterances about God and the word or name "God". Where, it would be better that God had some meta property, but this notion of God does not have that metaproperty, which means we weren't even referring to the right God when the atheist uttered the atheistic premise. Or something like that. Where P -> ~P, and ~P -> P. I feel like I better supported that the atheist proves the existence of God, or that the theist also incorrectly referred to God with "God" and violated some meta-property of God like "God's name is always referred to directly." Or something. So it's like an undecidable problem. Either undecidable both ways, but I'm also sensing the possibility of one-direction, that is of atheism implying theism, while I'm less confident in the direction of theism implying atheism but I'm still leaving that open as a possibility. I sense that this is a rich source of material regarding God, properties and metaproperties. And I needed to get my thoughts out before doing any research about meta ontological arguments. Because my original thoughts were more important than doing background research. But maybe regardless of what was "more important", it was "more of the case" that it was because I couldn't help but prioritize it or prevent it come from coming out. Like I couldn't hold it back, more than I evaluated its importance. .... Now I'm trying to construct sentences... Is this just Russell's paradox again? That if one defines that as "that which couldn't be held back" as necessarily important. Then that I "couldn't hold back typing" my blog post to you would necessarily be important. Or more important than doing background research. But if it wasn't more important that I blog to you then it is not important...? Something like that. I feel like my mind was sent racing down this track of meta properties which are contradictory to themselves, or that exist when they don't exist, and don't exist when they exist, or something like that... I also had the thought that if we view "true" and "false" as the binary truth value of propositions in our belief system, then ................................................ had to take a shit ......................................................... Basically, I want to construct the same thing I did earlier, using "process and properties" rather than "metaproperties and properties". That is, if God as a property is identical to himself as a substance. And God is a process. And we agree with the axiom or the definition: "A process is a set of at least two properties, else it shall be just called a "property" and not a process". Then God can't be a process and a property at the same time. But if God is a singular property, with no meta-properties... Or no neighboring properties. Or identical with his metaproperties? Then God is a process with 1 property and no metaproperties, or something... Violating the metaproperty of having or violating the metaproperty "Has identical properties and metaproperties" or "Requires at least two properties for one to be named a meta-property." Or something.... That if he has this property, then he doesn't have this property. But then if he does have this property, then he doesn't have this property. Except it might be only in one direction. That having this property implies the existence of this second property. But the existence of this second property doesn't imply the existence of the first property? Basically I was trying to say it favors the theist. I feel these meta concepts and properties and definitions are difficult to reference in a clear way. Why is that?