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418

If the underlying layers are completely hosed, how reliable or safe can these apps really be? Even assuming full blown TLS and SSL, I'm still not convinced these apps are that good. For example, Signal doesnt allow you to set a conversation password or cert, which makes me think it's nothing more than giving false hope to idiots

If the underlying layers are completely hosed, how reliable or safe can these apps really be? Even assuming full blown TLS and SSL, I'm still not convinced these apps are that good. For example, Signal doesnt allow you to set a conversation password or cert, which makes me think it's nothing more than giving false hope to idiots

(post is archived)

[–] 6 pts

Fun topic.

Rule of thumbs are:

  1. How interesting are you? Whistleblower like Snowden or Assange? Consider yourself burned. Or, just an average dude with unfavorable political opinions? Meh - you aren't worth the effort. Example: for high value targets, US gov't has been known to intercept laptops and phones between the retailer (Amazon,etc.) and the target to pre-install spyware. That's expensive and only done for high value targets.
  2. Are you paying for the service? No? Then, you are not the customer - you are the product. Don't trust what you don't pay for. BUT: The exception to this is altruism: Some products are good (like Veracrypt) because the creators appears to have altruistic purposes. But, these are rare. AND - it is easier to put out a tool for altruistic purposes (like Veracrypt) vs running an ongoing service (like poal.co). Ongoing services are expensive to operate, so that's a red flag in itself.
  3. Where is the physical server? If you are an American - use a Chinese server. If you are Chinese - use an American server. So - WeChat is safer for an American to use vs. a US based service that may be subject to search warrants.
  4. Decentralization is key. Point to point encryption is worlds better than going across a central server.

So, specific to Signal:

  • only you can answer #1
  • you aren't paying for the service, what is their revenue model? A non profit asking for donations. Might be OK. If it is altruistic, then there may be hope. They are a non profit, so it would be of interest to look at their public records. (https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/463948126 ... looks like they got some large donations in 2013-2015 to build the tool. Would be interesting to dig and see who made those donations.)
  • points #3 and #4 should be both covered here if it is truly end to end encryption w/o a central server. The good news is that signal is open source. SO ... to be safe: (1) download the source code, (2) review it, study the encryption and key handling, (3) compile the source code from the copy you downloaded and reviewed. There are security guys who do this for personal interest. And, they would be screaming if they found red flags in the code OR the compiled download versions didn't match what they compiled independently. I haven't heard anyone screaming on signal, so likely safe. But, always evaluate your risk level before using any tool.

I proffered on a similar question on VPNs a month ago. Might be of interest: https://poal.co/s/technology/477036/9788f0d9-12e5-489c-b2c3-192bd1152a85

[–] 1 pt

My elaboration.

If you are using signal on an android phone and come to the attention of the Enemy either personally or as part of the group.

They have the power to replace the open source signal app with their own fork that will share conversations with spy agencies. Users will be none the wiser.

And all this is automated. Ai read conversations looking for key words.

Meaning you don't have to be important for them to spy. Probably just being a known white male conservative or right winger.

When you use Android you are using a spy tool. Nothing else can over come that.

[–] 2 pts

Excellent point!

If you are "an interesting person", you'd better be using a rooted device without access to the google play store.

[–] 0 pt

Nice take. 1995 called and wants it back tho.

[–] 0 pt

"Are you paying for the service? No? Then, you are not the customer - you are the product."

Once upon a time this was reliable, but with the coming of M$, not so much anymore. With their products (in particular Win 8, 10 &11), you not only pay for them, but still become the product. I see other companies beginning to follow the same business model.

[–] 6 pts (edited )

Only as safe as the device themselves. Which are not safe.

Signal only provides privacy against carriers and internet transport. It will not protect you against three letter agencies or google or apple. Or any invasive keyboard you may have installed or comes factory.

Edit: think of it as a privacy app with superior texting, rather than a security app.

[–] 1 pt

The can snoop but they need a warrant for comms to be admissible as evidence.

[–] -1 pt

And using signal is a red flag for the Enemy to pay more attention to you

[–] 4 pts

They can all be unencrypted. Best bet is to do like the original mobsters . . . Talk in person. Make sure you don't have any devices near you though because they can listen through them.

https://bigleaguepolitics.com/court-docs-show-fbi-can-intercept-encrypted-messages-from-deep-state-backed-signal-app/

[–] 0 pt

I hear Pine Barrens is nice this time of year bwos

[–] 4 pts

The information of interest is going to be the network of contacts you talk to, not necessarily what you said.

You can encrypt anything you want to with public key encryption and it will be nigh on unbreakable, but as soon as you start talking to your local militia they are going to add a keylogger to your keyboard or whatever. And your new best friend at the gym/range will really like wearing cargo shorts and have a crew cut.

ISIS used to drop messages into the draft folder of a gmail account, and just share the password

A recent comms app was a honeypot from the beginning, so none of these companies are putting your privacy ahead of their freedom to not be Hillary'd on a dark night.

OPSEC is challenging to do consistently, just look at the Intels track record in foiling muslim plots, who will have put their life on the line at remaining undetected.

I'd imagine it's fine for buying weed or whatever? security now relies on people being dull enough to not be worth the paperwork involved, or you not getting flagged by AI for mean tweets about vibrant urbanites

[–] 2 pts

First off, this is a good thing to ask.

A more specific approach is, "what's safe about them, and what's unsafe about them" and you have to think about this in terms of what you're trying to protect yourself from.

So there's the idea of who you are concerned about, this can be - Hackers, with various motivations - Your ISP - Other internet infrastructure orgs - Whoever runs the platform in question - Your device/operating system provider/manufacturer - Copyright holding groups - Your school or employer - Law enforcement - Other government agencies - Other countries governments - Political activist groups - Family, friends, aquaintances - Other users of the platform - this list could go on

You basically have to look at each one that matters in the context of why you're concerned about safety.

Pirating movies for example? Main thing is to make sure the traffic is not clear to your isp and keep copyright holders from knowing an IP address that can be tied to you.

Racist talk and don't want to get doxed? The platform owners themselves must be both willing and able to resist political activist groups, and not expose information that can link back to you. People made this mistake with discord over and over for example.

Fedposting with intent? You need to evaluate for every layer on that list.

It's basically a whole project to determine safety specifically for each use-case. You can't really rely on a blanket answer. And also you need to keep in mind that things can change, and be ready for that when it happens.

I know this is probably a frustrating answer but it's the right way to approach it. If anyone knows of detailed security assessments that allows commenting and updates for any of these platforms that's basically the way to go about this. Like I said it's a whole project to figure this out for each use case.

[–] 2 pts (edited )

There is no such thing as 'secure' on the internet.

Treat everything you type as public and archived.

Like so....

clears throat

Daniel Andrews can suck Winnie the Poohs honey covered cock, and needs to be slowly lowered into a woodchipper an inch at a time.

See? Now im either going to get disappeared by Absolutely Fantastic Plastic or not. Havent changed my tune in a couple of years and im still standing but knowing my luck ill get buttfucked in the end.

[–] 0 pt

There is no such thing as 'secure' on the internet.

I'd say a laptop booted from a read-only live CD from a random open WiFi access point would be pretty secure. They could find the access point and get security footage, but you're asking for trouble if you're opening your laptop and working on whatever at the place. I'd write out everything ahead of time and set the laptop not to turn off when the lid's closed. Set a script to email/post shit as soon as you connect to an open WiFi. Then leave that shit in your backpack and just stroll on by.

[+] [deleted] 1 pt
[–] 1 pt

it is safe and effectivetm

[–] 0 pt

For $2200 I'll build you a system that not even the NSA could mathematically break, using good old fashioned one time pads based on high entropy random numbers.

Fuck signal.

[–] 1 pt

Then you have the problem of keeping the OTP secure at all ends of the conversation.

[–] 0 pt (edited )

Then you have the problem of keeping the OTP secure at all ends of the conversation.

I solved for that already.

A zero trust model is easy to come up with in one sitting, so I did.

Theres actually two approaches. One where a service (potentially selectable on the users side, much like torrent trackers) acts as a mediator for initial connection. And one where dedicated servers are more involved, but theres still no server-side decryption (tradeoff is latency because it requires multiple back and forth round trips for encrypting, sending, and decrypting on the other users end).

Number I wrote is what it would cost me to drop work right now, and build it. Once built though, it would only cost somewhere between $10 per user on the low end for one implementation, up to $35-40 per user on the high end implementation. Those are the actual numbers for the two specific implementations.

[–] 0 pt

Involving servers ain't gonna work unless there's an easy way for any user to verify that the encryption is happening locally and there's no way for the servers to have access to the keys. Unfortunately, that's impossible. A trojan horse app could easily encrypt stuff locally and slip the key in and encrypt it with the server's key. Everything looks good on the user's end. Things are encrypted locally. Then they send the message and the server decrypts it to get the key, which can be used to decrypt the message. The encrypted message can be forwarded on to the recipient.

Any system that "does the encryption for you" is suspect.